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CHAPTER I.INTRODUCTION 
But history is neither watchmaking nor cabinet construction. It is an endeavor toward better understanding, 
and, consequently, a thing in movement. 
March Bloch, The Historian’s Craft1 
In the last three decades, the long standing Sino-Tibetan political conflict which is frequently 
referred to as the “Tibet Question”2 in the international political arena, has attracted the interests 
of different groups of people all over the world, including politicians, human rights activists, 
journalists, Buddhist communities, independent writers and scholars. Since the early 1960s, the 
worldwide Tibet Support Groups have organized numerous political demonstrations and 
discussions on Tibet-related topics such as the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) human rights 
violations, ecological and economic disasters in the Tibetan regions and indigenous, religious 
and cultural identity of the Tibetans. In addition to the activities of these supra-national 
organizations, religious and political speeches of the 14th Dalai Lama3 have been broadcasted 
widely on the multiple TV channels and thousands of articles about the contemporary Tibetans 
who both live inside and outside of Tibet have been published and circulated all over the world. 
In the context of “Shangri-la” paradigm4, most of that publicity has contributed to the 
romanticized, exoticised and essentialized image of the Tibetan other. Simply put, in most of 
these Orientalist articulations of the Tibetan other, the multiple and complex identities of 
Tibetans have been simplified, thus, all Tibetans have been characterized as peaceful, non-
violent, environmentally friendly, devout Buddhists. These simplistic -and often highly 
problematic- images of Tibetans have been both challenged and (re)produced to a certain extent 
by those Tibetan elites in exile. On the one hand, the mystic, spiritual image of Tibetanness has 
been appropriated because of its value as “symbolic capital” which has been transformed into 
political and economic capital. On the other hand, through modernization process and the 
                                                     
1 Marc Bloch, The Historian's Craft (New York: Vintage Books, 1953), 11-12. 
2 According to Goldstein; “the Tibet Question, the long-standing conflict over the political status of Tibet in relation 
to China, is a conflict about nationalism-an emotional-laden debate over whether political units should directly 
parallel ethnic units. This question pits the right of a “people” (Tibetans) to self-determination and independence 
against the right of a multiethnic state (the People’s Republic of China) to maintain what it sees as its historic 
territorial integrity.” Melvyn Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1995), ix. 
3 From now on, I will refer to the 14th Dalai Lama as the Dalai Lama. 
4 Shangri-la can be defined as mythical-Himalayan utopia introduced by the James Hilton in his novel, Shangri-la. 
Shangri-la paradigm can be summarized as mystification of Tibetan geography, Tibetan culture as well as Tibetan 
people. 
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development of Tibetan nationalism in exile, modern political and social concepts-which were 
primarily Western- such as democracy, human rights, and ecological awareness, have been 
integrated to the official rhetoric of Tibetan identity. Considering Tibetan national identity 
formation an important case study which can offer an alternative perspective to comprehend the 
complexity of the modern phenomenon of nationalism and nation-building process, the following 
question will be addressed in this thesis: how has the Tibetan national identity been constructed 
and negotiated by the Tibetan exile elites in order to obtain internal and global support to their 
political cause?5 Two analytical questions that will guide me to answer my leading question are: 
Why did Tibetan exile elites integrate some specific concepts and themes (not the others) such as 
democracy, non-violence, environmentalism and gender equality into Tibetan nationalist 
discourse at the very particular historical time periods and what kind of global and internal 
context enabled them to do so? 
 By tracing the historical development of Tibetan nationalism and national identity 
formation through reading written materials produced in exile, the broader aim of this thesis is to 
make a contribution to a larger debate on the characteristics of Tibetan nationalism. However, it 
is important to note that this thesis is not intended to capture Tibetan nationalism as whole; it is 
rather limited to one particular form of nationalism, the one created and promoted by the Dalai 
Lama and his entourage, the elite members of the Tibetan exile community. Simply put, the 
canonical form of Tibetan nationalism will be the scope of this thesis.  
Challenging to the conventional idea that Tibetan nationalism can only be characterized 
as religious nationalism and proto-nationalism with regard to the role of Buddhism and the 
institution of the Dalai Lama on its development, this thesis will support and further  George 
Dreyfus’s6 and Ashild Kolas’s arguments and that the process that gave rise to the Tibetan 
                                                     
5 What I mean by Tibetan political cause is the political agenda articulated by the Dalai Lama and his Central 
Tibetan Administration. Like many other political movements, the Tibetan movement is also fractional; there are 
important groups that do not necessarily agree with the official position of the CTA. However, since the main 
concern of this thesis is to map the dominant nationalist discourse, I will not discuss them here.  Considering the 
dominant discourse, it is important to note that although until the late 1980s the Dalai Lama and the CTA supported 
the idea of full independence, in 1988 with the statement the Dalai Lama issued in the European parliament in 
Strasbourg the decision to pursue “Middle Way Approach” which means “genuine autonomy” under the Chinese 
rule was taken.  
6 George Dreyfus, “Are We Prisoners of Shangrila?: Orientalism, Nationalism and the Study of Tibet,” Journal of 
the International Association of Tibetan Studies, no. 1 (October 2005): 14; and Ashild Kolas, “Tibetan Nationalism: 
The Politics of Religion,” Journal of Peace Research 33, no.1 (February 1996): 51-66. 
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nationalism involves a complex of interactions between Tibetan traditional religious culture, 
Western secular political norms and Western and Indian modernity experiences. These 
interactions were not one-sided but reciprocal since all three actors were influenced by each 
other through the course of these interactions. It is therefore my intention in this thesis to take 
this dialectical link between various actors who have been instrumental in the development of 
Tibetan nationalism into account to understand the process of Tibetan national identity 
formation. 
Theories of Nationalism 
The construction of Tibetan national identity should also be studied, discussed and analyzed 
within wider theoretical debates over nationalism. Such a study is indeed essential to locate the 
Tibetan case into the global one and to offer a comparative space for the further analysis. There 
is no doubt that “Nationalism” as a global political phenomenon has long been the subject of 
academic inquiry and many outstanding scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds have 
attempted to theorize “nationalism.” Most of these theories either supported one of the two main 
theoretical stances; “primordialist” versus “constructionist” approaches. On the one hand, 
primordialists claim that the nations have primordial origin and are deeply rooted in human 
evolutionary psychology and thereby “natural”. On the other hand, the constructionists claim that 
nations were constructed for political and economic requirements of the age of the modernity 
which enabled them to emerge.7 Since to discuss all theories of nationalism would be 
impossible- and it is not the primary concern of this thesis- I will briefly focus on some 
prominent examples of the constructionist approach and its critiques to clarify the diverse 
understandings and conceptualization of the term. 
One of the most important theories on nationalism was introduced by Eric Hobsbawm in 
his seminal book Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Building his theory upon Miroslav 
Hroch’s8 comparative studies of small European national movements and his division of history 
of national movements into three phases, Hobsbawm states that Phase A was “purely cultural, 
literary and folkloric and hand no particular political or even national implications whereas in the 
                                                     
7 Eric Kaufmann, “Primordialists and Constructionists: a typology of theories of religion,” Religion, Brain and 
Behavior 2, no.2 (2012): 140-160. 
 
8 See: Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985). 
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Phase B it is possible to find a “body of pioneers and militants of ‘the national idea’ and the 
beginning of political campaign for this idea.”9 In addition to these two phases, the Phase C 
refers to the period “when nationalist programmes acquire mass support or at least some of the 
mass support that nationalists always claim they represent.”10 In the Phase B, what he calls 
popular proto-nationalism, “states and national movements could mobilize certain variants of 
feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which could operate on the macro 
political scale.”11 According to Hobsbawm, the four main criteria for the emergence of popular 
proto-nationalism are 1) language 2) ethnicity 3) religion and 4) the consciousness of belonging 
or having belonged to a lasting political entity.12 In his analysis on the link between religion and 
proto-nationalism, Hobsbawm briefly comments on the Tibetan case by stating that “since there 
are comparatively few theocracies which have nation-making possibilities, it is difficult to judge 
how far purely divine authority is enough; the question must be left to the experts in the history 
of Mongols and Tibetans.”13 Although he did not discuss Tibetan case further on, Hobsbawm’s 
formulation on proto-nationalism provided insights into the contemporary characteristic of 
Tibetan nationalism which is often identified with “proto-nationalism” by several Tibet scholars 
who followed his theory- which I shall return to below. 
The second theory I would like to examine is Benedict Anderson’s theory of nationalism 
since it is generally accepted as one of the most important works in the field. In his seminal book 
Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined political 
community- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”14 and he further argues that: 
[Nation] is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion.15  
According to Anderson, several historical conditions made imagined communities come into 
being. What he called “cultural roots” to nationalism are; (1) the rise of secularism and the 
decline of the religious faith in the age of Enlightenment (2) decline of the legitimacy of sacral 
                                                     
9 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 12. 
10 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 12. 
11 Ibid., 46. 
12 Ibid., 46-80. 
13 Ibid., 72. 
14 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 2006), 6. 
15 Ibid., 6. 
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monarchy in the 17th century (3) the change in the apprehension of time and the development of 
the idea of “homogenous, empty time.” In addition to these historical changes, Anderson 
suggests that print-capitalism provided the new institutional space for the development of 
“modern” language which enhanced the idea of nationalism.16 
Anderson’s theory of imagined communities can be seen as another example of the 
“constructionist” model since he clearly refers to the link between nationalism, secularism and 
modernity and conceptualizes nationalism within this framework.  Despite the undeniable 
accuracy of his arguments and descriptions, his theory remains insufficient to answer an 
important question. If one of the most important historical conditions that made nationalism 
possible was “secular consciousness” how then will we explain the phenomenon of “religious 
nationalism”? 
An important objection to Anderson’s theory comes from a Subaltern Studies17 scholar, 
Partha Chatterjee, who raises the question: Whose imagined community18? Chatterjee criticizes 
Anderson’s argument that nationalisms in Asia and Africa-or postcolonial world- adopted a set 
of modular norms which were created by Western Europe, America and Russia in the first 
place.19 Instead, he claims that anti-colonial nationalism created its own domain of sovereignty 
by dividing the world of the social institutions and practices into two domains; the material and 
the spiritual.20 He then argued that although the material domain was primarily shaped by these 
western norms, the spiritual domain was the sphere “nationalism launches its most powerful, 
creative and historically significant project: to fashion a ‘modern’ national culture that is 
nevertheless not Western.”21 Chatterjee’s theory was indeed an important drive from the idea of 
“Western Universalism” and offered a critical perspective to comprehend “different paths to 
modernity.”  
The last theory I would like to focus on is the least known theory of Dawa Norbu ,an 
important Tibetan social scientist who wrote on “third-world” nationalism. In his book, Culture 
                                                     
16 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 44. 
17 Subaltern Studies Group refers to a group of South Asian-dominantly Indian- scholars who are interested in post-
colonialism with a particular focus on South Asian societies.  
18 Partha Chatterjee, Nation and Its Fragments, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3-14. 
19 Ibid., 5. 
20 Ibid., 6. 
21 Ibid., 6. 
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and Politics of Third World Nationalism, concentrating on the nationalism experiences of China, 
India, Egypt, Iraq and Mexico and criticizing the existed theories of nationalism as being West 
oriented and thereby being inadequate in explaining non-western nationalism, Norbu sought an 
answer to the question of how and why nationalist ideologies did evolve in the non-western, 
post-colonial world. Dawa Norbu also claimed that nationalism has both a traditional and 
modern component; “traditional culture provides the emotional power that mystifies the rational 
mind, while egalitarian ideology provides a rational framework for the resolution of social 
problems.”22 Unlike most of his counterparts, Dawa Norbu did not contrast religion and 
nationalism; he rather asserts that the world religions have potential for mass politics.23 
However, he distinguishes European and non-European nationalism by stating that religion 
played a fundamental role in the making of the former but not in the latter. This is indeed rather 
problematic argument which tends to homogenize Western experiences of nationalism and to 
simplify its complexities and to (re)produce the west-east dichotomy. However, it is still 
important to recognize the relevancy of his theory, especially in the Tibetan context. 
Literature on Tibetan Nationalism 
Surprisingly, there is a little scholarly literature on Tibetan nationalism even though it seems that 
the subject recently attracts more scholars who work on Tibet. Based on the review of existing 
literature, it can be argued that there is general consensus among Tibet scholars that Tibetan 
nationalism was the direct product of the exile existence which provided the initial stimulus for 
modern Tibetan identity construction. 24 Accordingly, it is asserted that since prior to the Chinese 
takeover in 1951 Tibet had not been a unified land and the Dalai Lama’s traditional political 
control had been limited to the Central Tibet it would be impossible-and anachronistic- to talk 
about Tibetan nationalism, nation-building process or “national consciousness” with regard to 
this period. It should be noted that, however, most of these scholars also acknowledged that prior 
to the Chinese, Tibetans had in fact different types of sense of belonging-rather than the 
“national” one- e.g. religious, linguistic, and ethnic which made them a “community”. Although 
                                                     
22 Dawa Norbu, Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1992), 2. 
23 Kolas, Tibetan Nationalism, 63. 
24 See: Dreyfus, Are We Prisoners,1-21; Dibyesh Anand, “(Re)imagining nationalism: Identity and representation in 
the Tibetan diaspora of South Asia,” Contemporary South Asia 9, no. 3 (2000): 271-287; and Kolas, Tibetan 
Nationalism, 51-66. 
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the accuracy of these arguments is undeniable, it would be an oversimplification to reach an 
immediate conclusion that only the political and social conditions of the exile could have made 
Tibetan nationalism possible. It is indeed true that prior to 1959, one can hardly talk about 
Tibetan unity in the sense of “national unity” or full-fledged Tibetan nationalism. But 
nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the nationalist ideology began to be articulated 
among Tibetan elites in the beginning of 20th century with the modernization attempts of the 13th 
Dalai Lama25-even though these attempts are generally considered a failure rather than a success. 
Therefore, without denying the fact that the current form of Tibetan nationalism was very much 
product of exile elites and thereby the experience of Chinese colonialism and the displacement, I 
will claim that Tibetan diasporic nationalism is a continuity of the process which was already in 
motion in the pre-Chinese Tibetan community.  
Another point that Tibet scholars have a consensus is the central role of the institution of 
the Dalai Lama in the development of Tibetan nationalism.26 Almost without any exception, the 
theorists of Tibetan nationalism overemphasized the Dalai Lama’s role in Tibetan community as 
a charismatic authority in Weberian terms which is often referred to as a unifying symbol of 
religion and politics and, consequently, Tibetan “nationhood”.27 According to Anand, for 
instance, the Dalai was “not the most prominent advocate of Tibetan cause but also it is main 
theoretician.”28 Similarly, George Dreyfus, in his article, Are we prisoners of Shangri-la? 
Orientalism, Nationalism and the study of Tibet, also attributes a very central role to the Dalai 
Lama stating that the Dalai Lama’s own intellectual evolution was the essence that formed 
Tibetan nationalism.29 Although I do agree that it is very important to recognize the symbolic 
and the political power of the Dalai Lama-both as an institution and as a person, Tenzin Gyatso – 
as well as its instrumentality on the formation of Tibetan nationalism, I also think that one should 
not immediately reach to the conclusion that the Dalai Lama is “the architect” of Tibetan 
nationalism. What I am suggesting here is to adopt a more critical approach that might help to 
understand the complex dynamics in the formation of Tibetan nationalism much better than a 
                                                     
25 In the proclamation he issued in 1913, the 13th Dalai Lama condemned China by stating that “we (Tibetans) are a 
small, religious and independent nation.” See: Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 1967), 248. 
26 See: Kolas, Tibetan Nationalism  and Anand, (Re)imagining nationalism. 
27 See: Anand, (Re)imagining nationalism and Jane Ardley, “Learning the Art of Democracy: Continuity and change 
in the Tibetan Government in-exile,” Contemporary South Asia, 12, no.3 (September 2003): 349-363. 
28 Anand, (Re)imagining nationalism, 282. 
29 Dreyfus, Are we Prisoners, 2-21. 
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deterministic approach which precludes alternative readings. Before to clarify what I mean by “a 
more critical approach” it is necessary to scrutinize these aforementioned theories. 
In her article, Tibetan Nationalism: Politics of Religion, Ashild Kolas critically analyzed 
the current theories of nationalism and their inadequacy to explain the Tibetan case. According 
to her, because of their overemphasis on the relationship between the secular politics and 
nationalism, most of the prominent theories of nationalism tend to neglect the role of religion or 
to reduce it to the antiquated proto-nationalism. She suggests that Tibetan nationalism can 
neither be defined as purely religious nationalism nor a modern secular nationalism. She rather 
conceptualizes Tibetan nationalism as an interplay between religion and secular modernity: 
Within the exile community, Tibetans contest the notion of “Tibetanness” in various ways. Religion 
comprises the main idiom of Tibetan identity; the source of unity within all Tibetans. Religion as a source 
of identity seems to be especially important to the uneducated, the elderly and recent arrivals from Tibet. 
On the other hand, the secular concept of Tibet is now being established as the primary idiom of identity, 
mainly as an elite project.30 
On the other hand, Dibyesh Anand suggests at the beginning of his article, Reimagining Tibetan 
nationalism: identity and representation in the Tibetan Diaspora of South Asia, that regarding 
Tibetan case one should situate himself between primordialist and constructionist approaches of 
nationalism since “the centrality of the process of imagination in constituting a nation is 
noteworthy, the existence of an archive from which this process draws resources is also 
undeniable.”31Referring to Benedict Anderson’s theory, he further argues that Tibet nation is 
“imagining community” rather than the imagined one since it is still being built.  According to 
Anand, this ongoing process of “imagining” is more like “a neo(Orientalist) representation 
strategy”32 of exile elites who intend to increase international support for their plight. Although I 
find difficult to argue against his main argument-which is that “Tibetan national identity is the 
product of constant negotiation and renegotiation among several interrelated discursive and 
material factors”33- I strongly believe that his overuse of the constructionist vocabulary and his 
striking claim that Tibetan national identity is constructed, multiple, fluid and changing leave us 
                                                     
30 Kolas, Tibetan Nationalism, 64. 
31 Anand, (Re)imagining nationalism, 274. 
32 Ibid., 272. 
33 Ibid., 284. 
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little room to understand it “as a category of practice” which directly influence the everyday 
social experiences of Tibetan exiles.34 
Among the others, George Dreyfus article, Are we prisoners of Shangri-la? Orientalism, 
Nationalism and the study of Tibet offers the most convincing analysis on Tibetan nationalism. 
He begins with criticizing Donald S. Lopez’s argument that “Tibetan nationalism is mainly the 
internalization of Western fantasies of Tibet.”35 Similar to Dawa Norbu’s theory of non-western 
nationalism, Dreyfus also emphasizes that the Tibetan nationalism has both modern and 
traditional component which equally resulted in the very particular expression of new Tibetan 
national identity. He further argues that “when Tibetans borrowed Western ideas and turned the 
notions like democracy and human rights, they grounded their views in a mixture of traditional 
Tibetan Buddhist ideas.”36 He states that “Tibetan nationalism is not just an internalization of 
alien values but an artful synthesis produced out of a complex heterological dialogue in which all 
the elements involved in the process interact with each other, and in the process change.”37 
Agreeing with Dreyfus’s and main point- my only objection to his arguments, as I mentioned 
above is the central role he attributed to the Dalai Lama, my current thesis is also written by the 
assumption that the contemporary Tibetan nationalism could only be grasped by acknowledging 
the dialectical link between the global forces and local conditions. 
Material and Method 
My research is primarily based on the content analysis of Tibetan Review, a Tibetan-exile 
publication which has been published since 1968. Tibetan Review is the first Tibetan-exile 
periodical in English and it was editorially “independent,” or in better words, semi-independent 
periodical. According to their official website, “Tibetan Review is independent because it is not 
funded by any government-including the Tibetan Government-in-exile-nor it is affiliated or 
related to any interest group.”38 However, these claims were not entirely accurate. It was indeed 
                                                     
34 I do build my argument here on Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker’s article, Beyond “Identity”, within which 
they criticize the constructionist and essentialist understandings of the concept of “identity”. Instead, they suggest 
focusing on the term as an analytical category which might “serve well the demands of social analysis.” See: 
Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker, “Beyond ‘Identity’,” Theory and Society 29, no. 1, (February 2000): 1-47. 
35 Dreyfus, Are We Prisoners 6. 
36 Ibid., 14. 
37 Ibid., 14. 
38 Tibetan Review.net, “Tibetan Review Background,” http://www.tibetanreview.net/index.php?id=74&type=p 
[accessed  May, 2012]. 
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true that Tibetan Review was not initiated by the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) or any 
other political organizations of the Tibetan exile community but nevertheless from the beginning, 
the editors and the contributors of the magazine have been politically and socially influential 
figures in the Tibetan exile community. The first editor of the magazine39, for instance, Lodi 
Gyaltsen Gyari was one of the founding members of Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) which is 
one of the most important Tibetan exile political organizations. In addition, he is currently 
working as the Dalai Lama’s special envoy based on Washington DC. After him, the magazine 
was edited by other politically important names such as Tenzin Ngawang Takla, Prof. Dawa 
Norbu and Tsering Wangyal, all very influential intellectuals who played an important role in 
shaping both local and international public opinion about Tibet. Simply put, they all were well-
educated elite members of the community who could communicate in English and had power 
and resources to further their own political agenda. For this reason, the analyses of the magazine 
provided important insights into the development of Tibetan nationalist ideology in exile. This, 
of course, does not mean that all the editors and the contributors of the magazine were Tibetan 
nationalists who sought to impose their ideology on the public. However, it was possible to trace 
when and why certain themes and notions which have been integrated into the mainstream 
Tibetan nationalist discourse started to be debated. It can also be suggested that the magazine has 
primarily targeted the international audience as well as the Tibetans who live in Europe and 
North America or the highly educated Tibetan readers of South Asia- at least for the initial years- 
who could read in English. I selected this magazine as my primary source since it was the only 
long-term Tibetan exile publication accessible from the Netherlands. Although there are many 
other important periodicals, magazines and newspapers published by the official institutions of 
the CTA and the Dalai Lama, neither the Dutch national archives nor the Leiden University 
library collection had the copies of them in their collection during the time of my research. To 
overcome this source limitation, I added several online sources including the websites of the 
worldwide Tibetan organizations-mostly the ones initiated by Tibetans themselves-, the other 
periodicals published by different Tibet-related organizations which were mainly available for 
the last two decades and finally, the autobiographies of the important Tibetan political figures 
such as the Dalai Lama and his elder sister Pema Jetsun into my analysis. This wide selection of 
                                                     
39 During that time (1967) the name of the magazine was The Voice of Tibet. 
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data enabled me to monitor the different viewpoints and perspectives on the same subjects and 
themes which provided the basis for the mainstream Tibetan nationalist discourse.  
On this methodological basis, this thesis is divided into three research chapters in 
addition to the introduction and conclusion chapters. I divided the chapters both in chronological 
and thematic manner. Each of the chapters follows a similar line of analysis; I begin with the 
demographics of the period of concern and then I move to the discursive and practical issues 
which characterized the periods. In this regard, the second chapter of the thesis focuses on the 
first decade of the exile years, the period from 1959 to 1972, which I call “foundational years.” 
In this chapter, I mainly scrutinize the initial themes and concepts which later provided a 
conceptual bedrock for the mainstream Tibetan discourse. Since it is very essential to grasp the 
political dynamics of the period, the second chapter begins with a descriptive part that outlines 
the historical background of the Tibetan case. After analyzing the nationalist discourses and 
practices, the second chapter ends with the year 1972 when the non-violence discourse officially 
and globally started to be promoted by the Dalai Lama and his entourage. The third chapter 
covers a broader period which starts from 1972 and ends with 1989, the year when the Dalai 
Lama was awarded Nobel Peace Prize. In this chapter, focusing on the articulations of non-
violent, environment friendly Tibetan image, I argue that the Tibetan nationalist discourse has 
been strategically (re)religionized by the Tibetan elites in order to meet global expectations. For 
a better understanding of this turning point toward religionization, I examine how regional and 
sectarian identities were suppressed and Tibetan identity tried to be homogenized by newly-
introduced identification policies. In the last chapter, I focus on the period from 1989 up to the 
present day which shows how the global actors and forces had been instrumental in the making 
of Tibetan national identity and some new globally popular subjects e.g. vegetarianism and 
gender equality were integrated into the mainstream nationalist discourse. 
A Clarification of Terminology: “Exile” versus “Refugee” 
It has been an important academic debate about the meaning of the terms “exile” and “refugee” 
and the semantic distinction between these two. The legal definition of the term “refugee” is 
based on the definition given by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
through the “UN Convention on Refugees” in Geneva in 1951, the international law on refugees. 
According to this convention, a political refugee is a person: 
12 
 
who is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to well founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion, 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country: or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the county of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it.40 
 The ambiguity of the term “refugee” has been debated both legally and academically. These UN 
criteria have no universal application and even if the county has ratified the Geneva Convention, 
it still has the option either to recognize certain people as refugee or to withdraw this status.41 
Therefore, most of the current political debates are framed around the question: who are 
“genuine refugees” and how they can be distinguished from those called “economic”, thereby 
unwanted migrants who claim on “refugee” status. The internationally accepted definition of the 
term “refugee” with its political connotation and the debates around it can be regarded as 
attempts to diagnose the factors that led to migration and they do not focus on the activities of 
those “refugees” in their “host country”.  That is where the term “exile” comes into the 
discussion because these activities that are specially designed to end a people’s stay in “host 
country” refer to the term “exile”.42  
According to Yossi Shain, exiles are persons who are engaged “[...] in political activity 
directed against the policies of a home regime, against the home regime itself, or against the 
political system as a whole, so as to create circumstances favorable to their return.”43 This 
definition implies that exiles have clear and precise political agenda which is first to challenge 
the present ruler at home and eventually to replace or overthrow him. Exiles organize their 
activities according to the hope for the “future” and the ultimate aim of “returning back to 
home.” 
With regard to the Tibetan case, it can be suggested that Tibetans correspond to the term 
“exile” much better than the term “refugee” because of their collective political activism. 
However, this emphasis on their collective political activism should not be seen as the 
simplification of the complex nature of Tibetan diaspora and the fractionality of their political 
                                                     
40 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, UN Convention on Refugees of 1951, 14. 
41 Stephanie Roemer, The Tibetan Government-in-exile: Politics at large (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 37. 
42 Ibid., 37. 
43 Ibid., 37. 
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identities. Being aware of this complexity, in this dissertation, the term “exile” will be used to 
refer the Tibetan elites who hold the political power in exile since the aim of this work is to 
analyze their nationalist agenda. 
Writing about Tibet: Politics of History Writing 
I wrote this thesis in a time of Tibetan self-immolation protests culminated both inside and 
outside of Tibet. Most recently, on 27 May 2012, two Tibetans were to set themselves in fire in 
Lhasa, Tibet’s tightly-controlled administrative capital. Subsequently, in June 2012, the Chinese 
authorities declared that Tibet is closed to foreign tourists for an indefinite period of time. The 
latest string of Tibetan self-immolation, as many are arguing, led to the country’s shutdown to 
the outsiders. Written in such a critical moment and a delicate political context, this thesis does 
not intend to discuss the validity of the political arguments made by the PRC or the Tibetan 
exiles. However, as a study of exile politics and exile nationalism, it indeed intends to contribute 
the scholarly discussions on the Tibetan exile community. In the light of the political nature of 
the Tibetan history writing and heightened political tensions in this new phase of the Tibetan 
struggle, I want to clarify several points about this thesis and my own stand as a researcher. 
Since I strongly believe that the duty of the historian is “to understand” rather than “to judge”44, 
in this thesis, I avoided making moral judgments on the Tibetan exile politics; I have rather tried 
to examine the Tibetan nationalist discourse articulated by exile elites and to analyze the themes 
and concepts embedded in this discourse “without being dragged into the trap of ‘sentimental 
scholarship’ which permeates in Tibetan studies.”45Doing so, an important aim of this thesis is to 
search for a more fruitful approach to the Tibetan studies and to open up new 
discussions/questions on Tibetan nationalism. In this regard, the arguments and the 
interpretations presented in this thesis are also open to further criticism and discussions. 
 
 
                                                     
44 For an interesting theoretical discussion on the positivist history writing and its anti-positive critique, see: Carlo 
Ginzburg, “Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 1 (Autumn, 1991): 79-92. 
45 Amalendu Misra, “A nation in exile:  Tibetan Diaspora and Long Distance Nationalism 1,” Asian Ethnicity 4, no. 
2 (2003): 203. 
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CHAPTER II. THE FIRST DECADE OF EXILE: THE FOUNDATIONAL YEARS 
The first decade of exile, more precisely the period from 1959 to 1972, can be regarded as the 
foundational years for the Tibetan exile community both at a practical and a theoretical level. To 
put it plainly, during this period, “a collective Tibetan national identity was fostered and the 
nation building process was initiated”46. The themes and political concepts which had been 
introduced by exile elites in the first decade of exile provided the conceptual bedrock for the 
mainstream Tibetan political discourse and played an important role in the development of 
Tibetan nationalism in exile. Tibetan genocidal claims, the theme of “returning to the homeland”, 
the emphasis on the cultural affinity and the historical ties between India and Tibet, the 
establishment of modern educational institutions, and the introduction of democracy as an ideal 
political system are examples of these foundational concepts and practices. Discussing these 
foundational concepts and practices, this chapter intends to outline the first decade of exile. 
However, to be able to acknowledge the dynamics of the first decade of exile, it is essential to 
have general knowledge about the historical background of the Tibetan case. Therefore, this 
chapter will begin by summarizing the political and historical events that resulted in the 14th 
Dalai Lama’s flight to India.   
Historical Background47: What is the Tibetan case? 
The political status of Tibet prior to 1951 has been the subject of many scholarly discussions. 
Whether or not Tibet48 was an independent country before the PRC’s takeover, is not an easy 
question to answer. Throughout the 20th century, both China and the British colonial 
administration in India had exercised control over Tibetan territory. With the official collapse of 
Manchu Empire which overran Tibet since 18th century, the nominal Manchu authority over 
                                                     
46 Fiona McConnell, “De facto, displaced, tacit: The sovereign articulations of the Tibetan Government-in-exile,” 
Political Geography 28 (2009): 346. 
47 For the detailed information on modern Tibetan history see: Melvyn Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-
1951: The Demise of The Lamaist State (London: University of California Press, 1989) and Tsering Shakya, The 
Dragon in the Land of Snows (London: Pimlico, 1999). 
48 What the term ‘Tibet’ referred to prior to 1951 has been the subject of another academic discussion.  Hugh 
Richardson, the British diplomat who served in Lhasa as an official for the colonial Indian government in 1930’s 
and 1940’s suggests two terms to explain what Tibet means; the political Tibet and ethnographic Tibet.  According 
to Richardson, “the political Tibet refers to the Central Tibet under the direct control of the institution of Dalai 
Lama, which was ruled by the Tibetan government from the earliest times down to 1951.” The region beyond that to 
the north and east (Amdo and Kham) is its “ethnographic” extension which people of Tibetan race once inhabited 
exclusively. In that wider area, local lay or monastic chiefs were in control of districts of varying size.” See: Melvyn 
C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and The Dragon: China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama (California: University of 
California Press, 1997), xi. 
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Tibet had ended in 1911. According to Shakya, from 1913 onwards, the Tibetans regarded 
themselves as independent of China but the successive Chinese regimes never accepted this, nor 
was Tibet able to obtain de jure recognition for her independent status.49  In spite of the lack of 
any clear-cut consensus among Tibet scholars, both Goldstein and Shakya affirm that until the 
eve of the Chinese invasion in October 1950, the Tibetan Government exercised internal and 
external freedom, which clearly demonstrated the country’s independence.50 Therefore, the 
period between 1911 and 195051  is frequently referred as the span of Tibet’s de facto not de jure 
independence.  
On October 1949, after a victory by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the Chinese 
civil war, Chairman Mao proclaimed the People’s Republic of China on Tiananmen Square. 
Having come to power, the Communists stated that one of the tasks for People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) was the liberation of Tibet.52  
The first military skirmish between Tibetan troops and the PLA took place at the end of 
May 1950, when a group of fifty PLA attacked Dengo, a small town situated on the bank of the 
Drichu, ninety miles from Chamdo. Although they captured Dengo and confiscated all Dengo’s 
communication equipment, there were no further attacks until October. The new attacks came 
from three directions and the main aim was to capture Chamdo to prevent the Tibetan troops 
from retreating to Lhasa. On 19 October, Ngabo, the governor of Kham, sent two messengers to 
inform the Chinese that he would surrender. The military action clearly demonstrated the 
Chinese military strength to the Tibetan government. Instead of marching straight on to Lhasa, 
the Chinese first attempted to persuade the Tibetan government that a negotiation settlement 
could be reached.53  
                                                     
49 Shakya, The Dragon, xxi.  
50 Ibid, xxiv and Goldstein, The Snow Lion, 30-36. 
51  In 1913 and 1914, with the intervention of Great Britain, the new Chinese Republican Government was pressured 
to participate in a conference with itself and Tibet in Simla, India. The Simla negotiations produced a draft 
convention in 1914. The final draft of the Simla Convention therefore declared that Tibet would be autonomous 
from China, but also acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Although China did not agree to the convention 
at the end, it set the background for the Tibet Question during the next four decades. See: Goldstein, The Snow Lion, 
30-36. 
52 The Commander-in-Chief of the PLA, Zhu De, in a speech to the Chinese Peoples’ Political Consultative 
Conference on 24 September 1949, said: ‘the Common Programme demanded the waging of the revolutionary war 
to the very end and the liberation of all the territory of China, including Formosa, the Pescadores, Hainan Island and 
Tibet’. Shakya, The Dragon, 3. 
53 Ibid., 38-45. 
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The Tibetan government first attempted to seek international support and instructed 
Shakabpa54 to make an appeal to the United Nations. However neither India and Britain nor the 
U.S. were prepared to take the initiative in placing Tibet’s appeal on the UN agenda. Although 
El Salvadorian delegation requested “the invasion of Tibet by foreign forces” to be included in 
the agenda for the General Assembly, however, the Korean issue took over the UN’s agenda and 
the subsequent debate on Tibet was adjourned without a decision.55 
This lack of support in the international arena forced the Tibetan Government to proceed 
with the negotiations with the Chinese. The negotiations between the Tibetan and the Chinese 
delegation started on 29 April 1951 at an army headquarters in Beijing. On 23 May, the final 
copy of the agreement entitled “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local 
Government of Tibet on Measures of the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” which is also known as 
“17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” was signed by the delegates.56 
Signing the agreement was later considered invalid by Tibetan exile community, as having been 
unwillingly signed under duress. The 14th Dalai Lama also stated that the Tibetan delegation was 
not authorized by Lhasa to sign it.57 It should be kept in mind that all these statements were made 
later on in exile. At the time, there was no immediate reaction by the Lhasa government to 
repudiate the agreement although they were alarmed by the terms of the agreement.58 Finally, 
after protracted discussions, on 20 October 1951, a year and thirteen days after the Chinese 
invasion of Chamdo, a letter of acceptance of the 17-Point Agreement was drafted by the Lhasa 
government.59 The de facto independence that Tibet had enjoyed since 1911 had ended; Tibet 
officially became part of the PRC. 
                                                     
54 Shakabpa was a Tibetan nobleman who was appointed Minister of Finance in 1939. Because of his previous travel 
experiences to China, India, England, USA, Italy, France and Switzerland as head of a Tibetan Trade Mission, he 
was later appointed to serve as chief negotiators with the Chinese. 
55 Ibid., 52-61. 
56 Ibid., 65-69. For the entire document, see Appendix 1. 
57 The 14th Dalai Lama describes his initial reactions in his first autobiography: “Neither I nor my government were 
told that an agreement had been signed. We first came to know of it from a broadcast which Ngabo made on Peking 
Radio. It was a terrible shock when we heard the terms of it. We were appalled at the mixture of Communist clichés, 
vainglorious assertions which were completely false and bold statements which were only partly true and the terms 
were worse and more oppressive than anything we had imagined.” See: His Holiness the Dalai Lama, My Land and 
My People (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), 81. 
58 Shakya, The Dragon, 71. 
59 Ibid., 89. 
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According to Shakya, when they first arrived in Tibet the Chinese officials followed the 
policy to win over the upper classes as ordered by Mao Zedong. By the end of 1951, with the 
arrival of thousands of PLA troops, the population of Lhasa and surrounding areas had doubled. 
The logistics of accommodating and supplying provisions was the biggest problem which caused 
an enormous burden on Tibet’s traditional subsistence economy.  The rising price of food and the 
acquirement of land by the Chinese caused a great deal of resentment from the Tibetan peasantry 
who suffered most from the severe strain on Tibet’s fragile economy. While the Tibetan 
peasantry was carrying the economic burden of the influx of Chinese, aristocrats and traders 
were enjoying new business opportunities; they sold land, food, fuel and construction materials 
to Chinese at exorbitant prices.  60  
The Chinese first dismissed the two acting Prime Ministers of Tibet who were known as 
opponents to the Communist rule and 17-Point Agreement. Secondly, they successfully 
suppressed an anti-Chinese organization calling itself People’s Representatives.61They also 
successfully manipulated the antagonistic relationship between the Lhasa government and the 
Panchen Lama.62 By the end of 1954, the Dalai Lama and the entire Tibetan hierarchy were 
invited to Beijing. This visit of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan officials to China provided the latter 
with the international recognition of the Chinese claims on Tibet.63 This earlier period of Chinese 
administration in Tibet, Shakya asserts, was the period when the relationship between the 
Chinese and Tibetans was at its best.64 However, this friendly atmosphere did not last long. 
The situation in the Kham and Amdo region of Tibet (see map 2) which was inhabited by 
ethnic Tibetans was rather different than Lhasa. Since these areas traditionally were not under 
the jurisdiction of the Lhasa government, the Chinese immediately implemented communist 
reforms such as redistribution of land and the classification of people into different class groups. 
                                                     
60 Shakya, Dragon, 93-95. 
61 Ibid., 96-111. 
62 Ibid., 113-118.  Panchen Lama is the highest ranking Lama after the Dalai Lama and traditionally lived in 
Tashilhunpo monastery in Shigatse. He was traditionally responsible for the administration of the region. However, 
due to the conflict occurring between the 13th Dalai Lama and 9th Panchen Lama, the 9th Panchen Lama fled to 
inner Mongolia, China and died in the Qinghai Province of China. After his death, his successor 10th Panchen Lama 
was also born in China and selected by 9th Panchen Lama’s officials. Since he is considered pro-Chinese by the 
Lhasa government, he was not allowed to enter Tibet prior to 28 April 1952. On 28 April, the 10th Panchen 
Rinpoche, escorted by over 1000 Chinese troops, entered Lhasa from exile.  
63 The photos of Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama and Mao Zedong were distributed all over the world. 
64 Shakya, Dragon,113-118. 
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The first confrontation over Chinese reforms in Kham and Amdo took place towards the end of 
1954. The subsequent fighting between Khampas and the Chinese ended with the destruction of 
two important monasteries where the rebels were deployed.65 
This led to the flows of refugees from Kham to Lhasa.  The news brought by refugees of 
the destruction of monasteries and the deaths of hundreds of monks created a panic atmosphere 
among the Central Tibetans.66 By the end of March 1956, the revolt in eastern Tibet was 
spreading into Central Tibet.67 The political situation had become more complicated with the 
Dalai Lama’s visit to India on November 1956. Since they were concerned that he might seek 
asylum in India, the Chinese reluctantly allowed him to go to India for the 2500th anniversary of 
Buddha’s birth.68 During his visit in India, the Dalai Lama contacted the Tibetan émigré 
69community in India that requested him to stay in India and to repudiate the 17- point 
agreement. 70 Despite the fact that the Dalai Lama intended to remain in India, Zhou Enlai who 
was sent by Mao Zedong to urge the Dalai Lama to return Tibet managed to persuade him by 
promising to slowdown the reforms.71 At the same time, when the Dalai Lama was in India, a 
growing number of refugees from Kham and Amdo arrived in central Tibet. By late 1958, with 
the establishment of the pan-Khampa resistance movement called “Four Rivers, Six Ranges” 
Khampa resistance turned to the nationwide rebellion.72 The clandestine support from America 
and the CIA involvement changed the course of the resistance. The CIA trained six Khampa 
guerillas and provided the rest of the guerillas with modern ammunition and automatic rifles.73 
News of success of Khampa attacks on Chinese garrisons shifted people’s sympathies towards 
the Khampas and by the beginning of 1959, a sizeable number of people from Central Tibet had 
joined the Four Rivers, Six Ranges.74 
                                                     
65 Shakya, Dragon, 131-141. 
66 Ibid., 141. 
67 Ibid., 147. 
68 Ibid., 149. 
69 By that time, a considerable number of people already left Tibet for India to seek asylum. This émigré community 
which located in Kalimpong, was composed of many influential people including the 14th Dalai Lama’s family 
members, two ex-presidents who were dismissed by Tibetans and wealthy landlords.  
70 Ibid., 148-153. 
71 Ibid.,  153-162. 
72 Ibid., 166-167. 
73 Ibid., 170-184. 
74 Ibid., 179. 
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On 7 March 1959, as it had been planned earlier, the Dalai Lama agreed to attend the 
dance show in the PLA headquarters three days later. Many Tibetan officials who were surprised 
by this announcement suspected that the Chinese would abduct the Dalai Lama. With the quick 
spread of the rumor in Lhasa, on the morning of 10 March, a stream of people headed towards 
the summer palace of the Dalai Lama, Norbulingka, demanding to see him.75 
 On 13 March, the crowd denounced the 17-Point Agreement, saying that the Chinese had 
betrayed the agreement by undermining the authority of the Dalai Lama. For nearly a week, the 
Chinese did not take any action to regain the control of the city and there was no sign that the 
uprising would fizzle out. On the morning of 17 March, two shells landed near the Norbulingka 
and that evening, the Dalai Lama (dressed in the traditional gown of a layman) and his entourage 
headed out of Lhasa. The Dalai Lama’s escape route was not accessible to vehicles and laid in an 
area under the control of Khampa resistance fighters, so it was fairly free of PLA incursions. The 
Dalai Lama’s party proceeded southward towards Lhuntse Dzong, sixty miles from the Indian 
border, where the Dalai Lama and the Lhasa government issued a proclamation setting up the 
new temporary Government of Tibet. When the rumors that the Chinese army was marching 
towards Lhuntse Dzong reached the area, the Dalai Lama had to admit that they could not remain 
in Tibetan territory. On 30 March 1959, the Dalai Lama, the political and spiritual leader of 
Tibet, crossed the border and went into exile in India.76 
First Exiles and the Role of Newly Founded Central Tibetan Administration 
Tsering Shakya notes that following the news of the Dalai Lama’s escape to India which was 
broadcasted on All India Radio, between April and May 1959 more than 7,000 Tibetans entered 
India and sought asylum.77 Although there are no detailed demographic data about the first wave 
of exiles, it is possible to make some assumptions about the demographic characteristics of this 
first group based on the population census and the demographic survey conducted by the Central 
Tibetan Administration in 1998. (Table1) According to table 1, the sex ratio among those aged 
55 to 74 heavily favored males, a strong indication that men far outnumbered women among the 
                                                     
75 Shakya, Dragon, 188-195. 
76 Ibid., 197-207. 
77 Ibid., 207. 
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first wave of refugees.78This data also reaffirms Shakya’s argument that after the Dalai Lama’s 
flight, many Tibetan soldiers and Khampa fighters were surrendering their weapons at the border 
and wanted to settle in India.79 It is also difficult to determine the socio-economic composition of 
the first exiles. On one hand, existing data indicates that most of the first exiles were the 
influential political and religious leaders who followed the Dalai Lama. On the other hand, the 
CTA even specified that approximately 60 per cent of the Tibetans at this time had been either 
farmers or pastoral peasants.80 The Indian Government’s (the GOI) rehabilitation and 
resettlement projects which demonstrate that many Tibetan peasants and nomads also arrived in 
India at the beginning of 1960s also affirms the CTA’s statement. In the first couple of years in 
exile, those peasants and nomads who were first recruited as road construction workers in 
Northern India were later settled in southern India by the GOI. 81 
According to Roemer, during the time of Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) the 
numbers of newcomers in exile was constant but relatively small compared with the initial years 
because of the restrictive politics of the PRC.82 Therefore, based on these data, it can be asserted 
that the first exile group who arrived in India between 1959 and 1976 were dominantly 
composed of the members of the dismissed Lhasa Government and their families as well as 
Tibetan peasants. They were an ethnically83 and socio-economically diverse, male dominant 
group.   
 
 
 
 
                                                     
78 Geoff Childs, Tibetan Transitions: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Fertility, Family Planning, And 
Demographic Change (Leiden : Brill, 2008), 155. 
79 Shakya, The Dragon, 207. 
80 Stephanie Roemer, The Tibetan Government-in-exile: Politics at Large (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 59. 
81 For a detailed anthropological study about one of these earlier settlements in south India, see: Melvyn C. 
Goldstein, “Ethnogenesis and Resource Competition among Tibetan Refugees in South India: A New Face to the 
Indo-Tibetan Interface,” in James F.Fisher, ed., Himalayan Anthropology (The Hague:  Mouton Publishers, 1978), 
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82 Roemer, The Tibetan Government, 60. 
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the Central Tibetans. 
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Table 1: Population of Tibetan Exiles by Age and Sex, 1998 
age males females 
sex ratio 
(males/100 
females) 
0-4 2,649 2,511 105.5 
5-9 3,772 3,641 103.6 
10-14 5,662 4,887 115.9 
15-19 6,646 5,517 120.5 
20-24 6,032 3,939 153.1 
25-29 5,940 3,741 158.8 
30-34 3,422 2,483 137.8 
35-39 2,341 2,169 107.9 
40-44 1,693 1,750 96.7 
45-49 1,489 1,621 91.9 
50-54 1,597 1,604 99.6 
55-59 1,990 1,484 134.1 
60-64 2,615 1,575 166 
65-69 2,247 1,289 174.3 
70-74 1,559 1,055 147.8 
75-79 800 668 119.8 
80-84 351 332 105.7 
85+ 132 151 87.4 
Total 50,937 40,417 126 
Source: 1998 TDS84 
As mentioned earlier, before the Dalai Lama’s flight, there was a small émigré community in 
Kalimpong, Darjeeling. Most of the member of this community were aristocrats and dismissed 
political leaders including two ex-prime ministers who had left Tibet in the 1950s with their 
portable property.  Once in exile, they organize themselves into the Tibetan Welfare Association 
(TWA) which carried out the first Tibetan political activities from an exile base between 1954 
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and 1959.85 Focusing the struggle against the Chinese invasion, The TWA’s organizations can be 
classified as: (1) lobbying with the international community with petitions based on the 
information obtained from inside Tibet. (2) organizing demonstrations in Northern India (3) 
having contact with the USA, who were clandestinely operating inside Tibet by supporting the 
eastern Tibetan guerilla forces.86 In spite of its remarkable political activities, some historians 
claim that conflicts between TWA members weakened the organizational structure and Tibetan 
aristocrats were accused of not being dedicated enough to the struggle for a free Tibet.87  With 
the effects of such criticism and the arrival of the Dalai Lama, the TWA disappeared from the 
political stage and it was replaced by the CTA in 1959.   Approximately a month after  his arrival 
in India, on 25 April 1959, the  Dalai Lama called an emergency meeting of the few senior 
Tibetan officials who had accompanied him from Tibet, and those who had arrived earlier in 
India(aristocratic members of the dissolving TWA) to discuss the situation and plan for the 
reconstruction in exile.88 The meeting identified a few areas of concentration: rehabilitation of 
the Tibetan refugees, education of the Tibetan children, preservation of Tibetan culture and 
identity, gathering and disseminating information regarding Tibetans both inside and outside 
Tibet, pursuing the Tibetan question at the United Nations, and preserving and promoting unity 
among the Tibetan refugee community.89 Soon after the meeting, on 29 April 1959, the 14th 
Dalai Lama officially proclaimed the CTA and he (re)established the Tibetan Government-in-
Exile, in Mussoorie, Uttarakhand, the hill station in the Northern India with the twin task of 
guiding the Tibetan struggle for national-self rule and rehabilitating Tibetan refugees. In 1960, 
the headquarters of the CTA was shifted on the initiative of the Government of India (GOI) from 
Mussorie to Dharamsala, the former British hill station in Himachal Pradesh. The Dalai Lama 
first set up four main departments; (1)the Department of Education(established in 1960) (2) the 
Home Department(established in 1959) which is responsible for all the rehabilitation schemes for 
Tibetans in exile (3)the Department of Religion and Culture(established in 1959) which is 
responsible for supervising works aimed at reviving, preserving and promotion of Tibetan 
religious and cultural heritage (4) the Department of Security which is primarily responsible for 
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the Dalai Lama’s security and until the establishment of the Department of Finance in 1966 was 
also responsible for financial affairs.90 Since it came into existence, the CTA has played a very 
influential role in the establishment and the administration of the Tibetan settlements in India. 
These settlements had been established by the initiatives of the GOI with the cooperation of the 
CTA. The earlier policies of the GOI toward the CTA can be considered to express a laissez faire 
attitude; despite of the fact that the GOI never recognized the CTA as the Tibetan Government, it 
accepted the CTA’s collaboration and its de facto authority on the Tibetans who live in these 
settlements. Although the GOI adopted a very liberal attitude toward the administration of 
Tibetans, it should also be noted that the GOI refused to settle all Tibetans in one area in North 
India as the CTA had suggested.91 Whatever restrictions and limitations the CTA met at this 
earlier stage of the exile; it had successfully constructed a centralized administration and 
dominated over the Tibetans through its officials appointed by the center.  
The Foundational Concepts in the Making of Tibetan Political Discourse 
The three main themes which have been widely articulated and adopted into the exile Tibetan 
political discourse came into being during the first years of the exile;(1) the genocide threat, (2) 
the theme of “returning back to homeland” and (3) the cultural affinity and the historical ties 
between India and Tibet as a counter argument to the Chinese claims over Tibet. All three 
themes occurred simultaneously with regard to the contemporary political situation in Tibet and 
they all can be associated with the nation building process that was initiated in exile. The 
perception of Tibet as a ‘lost homeland’ under the Chinese occupation had an immense impact 
on Tibetan life in exile. Through the strong emphasis on the notion of a ‘future free Tibet’ as a 
main goal of exile life, the ruling elites had succeeded to instill the sense of responsibility in the 
exile population. Furthermore, as a part of the nation-building process, the Tibetan political elites 
needed to build a sense of national unity with common origins and a shared history. To achieve 
this, the historical and cultural ties between India and Tibet were stressed while the hostile 
Chinese other was often depicted as a perpetrator of Tibetan genocide. In the following section, 
these three foundational themes will be examined in detail. 
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Since the very beginning of the exile years, the Dalai Lama and the CTA as well as other 
educated elites of the exile community have continually stated that the Tibetans were threatened 
by “genocide” in their homeland. Correspondingly, the Tibetan population in Tibet has often 
been portrayed as “the population in danger”. The discourse on genocide has been one of the 
strongest ideological weapons of the CTA not only to govern the exile population but also to 
influence the western public. The influence of the discourse of genocide on the western public 
was already proven by two reports of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) published in 
1959 and 1960. This commission charged China with genocide in Tibet, based on Tibetan 
religious belief.92 When the contemporary global political situation was taken into consideration, 
the instrumentality of the discourse on Tibetan genocide can be better understood. In 1960s, the 
word ‘genocide’ was globally associated with the atrocities of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust 
which were still fresh in the memories of millions of people. There was no doubt that the 
genocidal claims would attract the attention of the western public, foreign NGO’s and the 
political activists to the Tibetan issue. Furthermore, in the cold war atmosphere, a bad image of 
Communist China would be a useful means of propaganda for the non-communist bloc.  
However, the discourse on genocide cannot be seen as merely strategic maneuver to recruit 
foreign supporters for Tibetan cause.  Through the discourse on genocide, the CTA and the exile 
political cadre obtained the loyalty and the consent of the exile population. The emphasis on the 
urgency of the situation in the homeland had granted the CTA full governing authority despite 
the fact that it did not have any coercive power of territorially defined nation states such as 
military or judicial power.  
One of the first articulations of this discourse on genocide can be seen in the Dalai 
Lama’s alarming Press Statement of June 20, 1959 which spoke about the “danger of near 
annihilation” and “terrible deportation and execution of innocent men”.93 He made a similar 
statement on the second anniversary of Tibetan National Uprising Day on 10 March 1961. 
Referring to the reports of the International Commission of Jurists, he said that: 
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[…] the Chinese have been guilty of genocide by reason of killing many Tibetans with the intent of 
destroying the Tibetan religion and by deporting thousands of Children to China.94 
During my research on Tibetan Review, I have come across several articles and reports which 
repeatedly mentioned the genocide threat.  For instance, according to the article “Tibet Today: A 
Nation in chains” by Sonam Wangdi, situation in Tibet was depicted as such: 
The Chinese have been consistently engaged in the extinction of everything-culture, art, religion, education 
and even the physical basis of racial identity of the Tibetan people. […] The refugees also say that almost 
all the monks and educated people have been killed or tortured to death. […] No facet of Tibetan life has 
escaped the ruthless attacks by the Chinese in their campaign of “hanization” of the Tibetan people.[…] In 
short it can be said that no other people in the world have subjected to such a systematic extermination of a 
nation and its culture since the “New Order” of Hitler’s third Reich.95 
The strong and alarming tone of the article can be easily recognized. The words chosen to define 
the situation in Tibet; “extinction”, “systematic extermination” and the comparison of the 
Tibetan case with the Holocaust clearly implies the acts of “genocide” although the word 
“genocide” itself was not mentioned explicitly.  
In his article, T.N. Nakla, one of the contributors of Tibetan Review uses the word 
“genocide” referring to the International Commission of Jurists’ reports documented in 1960. He 
writes, “Act of genocide has been committed in Tibet.”96 He also compares the Chinese 
aggression in Tibet with the “the policy of apartheid” and continues, “Tibetan people are 
subjected to even greater brutality and suppression than their suffering brethren in Africa.”97  
Another example can be given from the quote of the Dalai Lama’s speech in the opening 
ceremony of the Higher Tibetan Studies. This passage clearly shows how the sense of 
responsibility had been instilled in exile community referring to the discourse on genocide: 
His Holiness declared that today in Tibet, the Buddhist Culture of Tibet can “neither be seen nor heard” and 
that the Chinese were carrying on a ruthless drive to uproot all traces of the indigenous Tibetan civilization. 
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In the face of this critical situation, His Holiness remarked that it was the imperative duty of all Tibetans to 
preserve their ancient cultural heritage.98 
As was mentioned earlier, the discourse on genocide had been highly instrumental in controlling 
and regulating the exile population. Anthropologist Goldstein, who conducted fieldwork99 in one 
of the earlier settlements of Tibetan exiles in Mysore, South India during the late 1960’s, draws a 
clear picture of how the discourse on genocide functioned to promote ethnic endogamy and 
pronatalism. During his fieldwork, he observed that ‘endogamy was vigorously encouraged by 
the local Tibetan administration; it was portrayed as absolutely fundamental to the preservation 
of the Tibetan race, a race endangered by the actions of Communists in Tibet.’100Similarly, he 
shows how pronatalism as a nationalistic call to counteract genocide had been promoted by the 
local administration that vigorously opposed to use of birth control.101 This research shows that 
the discourse on genocide enabled the CTA to advocate pronatalism and the ethnic endogamy as 
a form of social engineering. 
The second most articulated theme which constitutes the mainstream Tibetan political 
discourse is the theme of “returning to the homeland.”  From its earlier days, the exile 
community operated in the belief that they would be returning to Tibet. There is no doubt that the 
very definition of the exile politics, in general, includes the ultimate aim of regaining the 
homeland. Yossi Shain stresses that “exiles are engaged in political activity to create 
circumstances favorable to their return.”102 In this regard, the theme of “returning to the 
homeland” can be seen as a fundamental component of the exile existence. Correspondingly, the 
theme of “returning to the homeland” which had procured the necessary ground to produce and 
to maintain the legitimacy of the policies and the operations of the CTA became an ideological 
instrument of the exile elites.  As steps on the road of return to the homeland, the Dalai Lama 
and the CTA reminded the imperatives duties of Tibetan exiles; (1) to preserve the Tibetan 
culture and identity and (2) to be equipped with modern civilization. The relationship between 
“future free Tibet” and “exile responsibilities” can be detected in the Dalai Lama’s statement on 
1968 on the occasion of the 9th anniversary of the Lhasa Uprisings: 
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[…] Tibetan children, whom I look upon as the future foundation of a free and independent Tibet, are being 
provided with the best possible opportunities of development deeply rooted in their own culture, belief and 
living habits, as well as acquainted with modern civilization, enriched by the greatest achievements of 
World culture, and thus becoming sound and creative Tibetan citizens, capable of serving our nation and 
the whole mankind.103 
In a similar manner, the governing policies introduced in the exile context had been promoted as 
the “modernization” of the traditional Tibetan Administration for the future administration of 
independent Tibet. Thus, modernization without losing Tibetan culture and identity was 
considered the only way of serving the Tibetan nation. 
The third dominant element in the earlier Tibetan political discourse was the emphasis on 
the cultural affinity between India and Tibet. India has been one of the main determinants in the 
construction of homogenous Tibetan identity in exile. There is no doubt that the policies of the 
GOI toward the CTA and the Tibetan exiles had a tremendous effect on the development of 
Tibetan nationalism in exile. However, the role of India in the construction of Tibetan identity 
should not be solely reduced to the Indian politics toward Tibetan exiles. Culturally speaking, the 
historical ties between India and Tibet which were underlined extensively by the Dalai Lama and 
exile elites provided one of the foundational myths for Tibetan nationalism. The emphasis on the 
cultural affinity between Tibetans and Indians had become the major alternative narrative to the 
Chinese one which claimed that Tibet absorbed civilization mainly from China and thereby, that 
it had been historically part of China.  
An article entitled “How Chinese was China’s Tibet Region?” and published in Tibetan 
Review can be given as a very good example of this search for an alternative narrative. The 
writer of the article Nirmal C. Sinha104, who was a Tibet scholar and also the editor of Tibetan 
Review, intends to disprove the Chinese claims over Tibetan identity by analyzing ‘the 
constituent contents of civilization (which are)language, religion, polity, arts, literature, legends 
and history, food and dress, family life and occupational pattern’.105 In the language section of 
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his analysis, he underlines the fact that “Tibetan script derived from some Indic scripts prevalent 
in Kashmir”106. He also recalls that Tibetan script is known as “Lhasa Sanskrit”107 in Nepal 
which, according to him, affirms the historical fact that the Tibetan script derived from Sanskrit. 
In the section on religion, challenging the Chinese version of the story that claims Buddhism 
came to Tibet from China, he argues that “Tibetan legends preserve vague memories of the first 
advent of Buddhism from India before the entry of Buddhism from the west [China] into 
Tibet”.108 Concerning the Tibetan art, he describes the relationship between Tibet and India as 
“mother-daughter relationship; the one [India] gave the life the other [Tibet]”, while he considers 
Chinese influences on Tibetan art “peripheral”.109 In the last section of his analysis, he focuses 
on the literature and history of Tibet. He asserts that “Asoka (the first Buddhist king of India) 
became a sort of national hero for Tibet”110. He also stresses that “the Indian science of dialectics 
flourished in Tibetan Buddhism” and “in Tibetan cosmography, India and Tibet formed one 
zone.”111  What is so remarkable about this article, perhaps, is the selection of the concepts 
which were defined as “the constituent contents of civilization”. The word “civilization” here can 
be seen as an equivalent of the word ‘nation’ since all these themes are conventionally referred 
as the unifying elements of a nation; common language, culture, history and even religion. Is it 
then possible to argue that the search of the affinity between India and Tibet was a part of 
Tibetan nation building process? This question can be answered yes in a certain extent. It is clear 
that the emphasis on the Indic elements in Tibetan culture was highly important to challenge the 
Chinese argumentation. Nevertheless, it should also be kept in mind that an important 
component of Tibetan nation building process was the belief in national “superiority”. This 
feeling of superiority, the sense of pride in Tibetan language, custom, religious institutions, 
“modernized” government, and of course, in His Holiness, the Dalai Lama have been instilled 
through the modernized national education. It may indeed be useful at this point to analyze the 
development of Tibetan education. 
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Creating a “Modern Tibetan Nation”: The Establishment of Modern Schools 
One of the major institutional forms, and perhaps the most effective one, through which the 
“imagined community”112 came to acquire concrete-shape is the school education. The schools 
are the places where the national history, national language and national symbols are 
systematically taught. Thus, it is not surprising that from the earlier days of exile, both the Dalai 
Lama and the CTA have given special attention to the issue of education. Jetsun Pema, sister of 
the Dalai Lama, mentions in her autobiography that in the beginning of 1960s, the Dalai Lama 
was very preoccupied with the issue of the education of Tibetan Children: 
His Holiness attached a great deal of importance to education and liked to remind his officials of a meeting 
with Nehru113 when the latter had said that the provision of education was Tibet’s hope for future.114 
The Dalai Lama also remarks in his memoirs: 
We have to do something drastic to preserve their [Tibetan Children] health-and their education was also a 
matter of paramount importance.115 
With these motivations, the Dalai Lama and the CTA immediately took the lead in mobilizing 
national efforts to start schools in the settlements dispersed all over India. The first school in 
India was established Mussoorie on 3 March 1960 with a batch of 50 selected adolescent 
students and four Tibetan teachers.116  The following year the Department of education was 
established under the CTA and two more schools were opened in Simla and Darjeeling.  By 
1961, there were 800 students enrolled in these three Tibetan schools.117 In the same year, with 
the financial support of the GOI, ‘The Tibetan Schools Society’118 which took over the 
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management of three former schools was set up. By 1967, the total enrolment for the seven 
Tibetan schools was almost 6,000 students.119 
According to Tsepak Rigzin, there were two main objectives of establishing Tibetan 
schools in exile: 1) to impart modern education to Tibetan children so that they are fully 
equipped to face the challenges of the modern world and to reconstruct Tibet’s future, and (2) to 
enable Tibetan children to preserve Tibet’s rich cultural heritage, religion and identity.120  
Another report published in Tibetan Review on the development of the Tibetan Schools 
Society explains the general principle followed in framing the educational system: 
[…] Students should be given a modern education so that the foundations could be laid for the training of 
future engineers, doctors, nurses, lawyers and other professions. Even in the teaching of traditional subjects 
such as Tibetan language and literature, efforts were made to incorporate modern methods and special text 
books were written by a committee of Tibetan experts under the direction of the Council for Tibetan 
Education.121 
It is possible to recognize the familiar discursive theme- the notion of “future free Tibet” - both 
in previous quotations from the Dalai Lama and his sister, Jetsun Pema, as well as the following 
statements on the objectives of the Tibetan education. There is no need to discuss much about the 
formative power of this discourse of “future free Tibet” on Tibetan educational policies since this 
point was already clarified. What it is really interesting about these quotations and is the explicit 
articulation of the goal toward nationalist modernization. The perception of “the modern 
education as a requirement to face the challenges of the modern world” together with the 
emphasis on “the preservation Tibet’s culture, religion and identity” clearly show how modern 
education was seen as a main instrument by exile elites to modernize Tibetans and to create a 
modern Tibetan nation. One of the first outcomes of these nationalistic aspirations which came 
into existence through education was the standardization of the Tibetan language.  
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In his seminal book, Seeing like a State, anthropologist James C. Scott correctly argues 
that “the imposition of a single, official language may be the most powerful of all state 
simplifications.”122 According to him, the implicit logic of the move was to define a hierarchy of 
identities, relegating local languages and their regional cultures to, at best, a quaint 
provincialism.123 The imposition of “Lhasa Dialect” as an official language on the Tibetan 
exiles-who came to India from widely separate regions in Tibet where they spoke mutually 
unintelligible dialects, operated under different sociopolitical systems, and were traditionally 
hostile-124was also such an attempt of standardization. The newly established Tibetan schools 
provided the space where the Tibetan language was officialized and standardized. The notable 
success of the Tibetan campaign of linguistic centralization was observed by Goldstein: 
Lhasa Tibetan has come to be used as a lingua franca in the camp.[…] The school system does a truly 
excellent job of a teaching literary Tibetan [Lhasa version] to the refugee youth on a high level of 
proficiency. For the older refugees there are night schools that teach enough so that a person can read a 
newspaper.125 
The Tibetan schools were (and are) also the places where the Tibetan children learned their 
national symbols such as the “Tibetan national anthem”. In this sense, as Goldstein notes, ‘a new 
national anthem which was sung daily in the schools played an important role in mobilizing 
national sentiments.126 The creation of a new Tibetan national anthem was a perfect example of 
an invented tradition, and it deserves to be mentioned here. The concept of “invented traditions” 
which was introduced by historian Eric Hobsbawm refers to “set of practices, normally governed 
by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual and symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate 
certain values and norms, which automatically imply continuity with the past”. 127 Written in 
exile128 and modeled after traditional religious prayers, the Tibetan national anthem is 
“emotionally and symbolically charged sign of Tibetan group membership.” Following 
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Hobsbawm’s thinking, it can be said that it inculcated “patriotism”, “loyalty” and “duty” in 
Tibetans.”129 
Tibetan National Anthem130 
Let the radiant light shine of Buddha’s wish-fulfilling gem teachings, 
 the treasure chest of all hopes for happiness and benefit in both secular life and liberation. 
 O Protectors who hold the jewel of the teachings and all beings, 
 nourishing them greatly, may the sum of your karmas grow full.  
Firmly enduring in a diamond-hard state, guard all directions with Compassion and love. 
 Above our heads may divinely appointed rule abide endowed with a hundred benefits and let the power increase of 
fourfold auspiciousness, 
 May a new golden age of happiness and bliss spread throughout the three provinces of Tibet and the glory expand 
of religious-secular rule.  
 By the spread of Buddha’s teachings in the ten directions, 
 may everyone throughout the world enjoy the glories of happiness and peace. 
In the battle against negative forces may the auspicious sunshine of the teachings and beings of Tibet and the 
brilliance of a myriad radiant prosperities be ever triumphant. 
 
Although the anthem has clear religious connotation and it is written in the form of a traditional 
Buddhist prayer, it is also possible to distinguish political motives embedded in it, as when the 
anthem refers to “battle against negative forces”. Another striking reference is “the religious-
secular” rule which indeed sounds paradoxical. I believe that the idea of “religious-secular rule” 
which I think the best summary of modern Tibetan political views in that refers to the Tibetan 
democratization process. This is indeed right juncture to move to an analysis of the process of 
democratization in the Tibetan community.  
The Process of Democratization 
Even prior to my departure from Tibet in March 1959, I had come to the conclusion that 
in the changing circumstances of the modern world, the system of governance in Tibet 
must be modified and amended so as to allow the elected representatives of the people to 
play a more effective role in guiding and shaping the social and economic policies of the 
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State. I also firmly believed that this could only be done through democratic institutions 
based on social and economic justice. 
The Dalai Lama of Tibet131 
The impetus for democratization in the Tibetan community in exile came from above on the 
initiative of the Dalai Lama.  In February 1960, at Bodh Gaya (Bihar, India) the Dalai Lama 
outlined a detailed program designed to introduce the exile Tibetans to the practice of 
democracy. He advised them to set up an elected body with three exile representatives each from 
the three provinces (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo) and one from each of the four religious schools 
of Tibetan Buddhism (Gelug, Sakya, Kagyu and Nyingma). Elections were held and the first 
elected representative body in Tibetan’s history “The Commission of Tibetan People’s Deputies 
(CTPD)” took oath on 2 September 1960. Eventually, on 10 March 1963, the Dalai Lama 
promulgated the first Tibetan exile constitution consisting of 10 chapters and 77 articles.132 This 
provisional constitution included international human rights instruments, particularly the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Fundamental Principles of the Law of the 
Land.133 
In this earlier stage, the Tibetan concept of democracy, however, was radically different 
from that of the West. The crucial political role of the institution of the Dalai Lama played in the 
process of Tibetan democratization marks this fundamental difference. In Tibetan belief system, 
the divine authority of the Dalai Lama is inherited through reincarnation; he cannot be elected. 
His position in the government is therefore seen as the major challenge to the Tibetan 
democratization process.134 Being aware of this challenge, the Dalai Lama addresses the issue of 
his authority and expressed his future aspiration to move toward secular democracy: 
His Holiness has remarked, the total commitment to democratic ideals as set forth in the future Constitution 
for Tibet stipulates that only the sovereign will of the people can decide the future political system, 
including the political powers and prerogatives of the Dalai Lama.135 
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Why then was it one of the first exile political actions of the Dalai Lama to initiate the process of 
democratization? Two interrelated answers can be given to this question. Firstly, it can be 
suggested that the Dalai Lama considered democratization a necessary step be taken if his 
government is to be recognized as legitimate by the foreign powers. Secondly, it can be argued 
that the efforts of the Dalai Lama to democratize the Tibetan exile polity was directed at an 
international audience with an aim to emphasize the progressive nature of the contemporary 
polity compared with both old Tibet and modern China.136 Alternatively, the Tibetan 
democratization attempts can be seen as a part of the larger process of Tibetan modernization 
(in-exile).  To a certain extent, all of these possible answers are convincing. There is no doubt 
that the process of democratization was an important tool for Tibetans to use against the Chinese 
government. As an ideal role model for the future administration of free Tibet, the process of 
democratization both challenged the contemporary authoritarian Chinese rule in Tibet and the 
feudal administration of ‘old Tibet’. It is also true that Tibetan claims to democratic governance 
attracted international sympathy for the Tibetan political cause. Without denying the 
international importance of the democratization process, I will instead focus on the relationship 
between Tibetan modernization process and the appropriation of democracy as an ideal political 
system. As George Dreyfus correctly asserts, “what is usually neglected is the degree to which 
the early years spent in India were formative to the Dalai Lama’s stance toward modernity and 
modern political culture.”137 In particular, the experience of the exile and the encounter with 
Indian democracy were important in developing the commitment to human rights and democratic 
values expressed in the democratic constitution promulgated by the Dalai Lama.138 
 I will also claim that the internal use of the concept had played a remarkable role in the 
development of Tibetan nationalism. The discourse of democracy -and the practice of 
democracy- allowed the sophisticated articulation of national identity among Tibetan exiles. 
Through the democratization process the CTA sought to be the representative body of all 
Tibetans. The inclusion of the traditionally excluded regions (Kham and Amdo) to the exile 
parliament created a new sense of national identity. Hereby, the Tibetan democratization process 
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which ensures ‘unity-in-diversity’139should be seen as one of the constituent elements that 
shaped Tibetan nationalism.  
Conclusion 
It is therefore clear that in the first years of the exile, both the Dalai Lama and the political elites 
of the Tibetan exile community found themselves in the critical position of being compelled to 
take immediate actions to rebuild the Tibetan community- in- exile. Throughout this chapter, I 
have focused on the crucial elements of this earlier stage of the Tibetan nation building process. 
In this regard, I have stressed that the themes and the concepts that shaped Tibetan 
political discourse in this earlier stage of exile, instilled “the sense of national responsibility” in 
the Tibetan exile community. Furthermore, I have discussed the two institutional changes which 
occurred in this period; the development of modern education and the democratization process. 
My analysis shows that the primary objective of these political practices was to modernize the 
Tibetan exiles. In this formative age, the Dalai Lama’s and the Tibetan elite’s encounters with 
the Indian politicians, their interactions with Indian democracy and modernity experiences were 
indeed very influential on Tibetan modernization. The next chapter which will focus on the 
period from 1972 to 1989 will analyze the changes that came about in the process of Tibetan 
modernization and nation-building. 
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CHAPTER III. A RELIGIOUS TURN? TIBETAN NATIONALIST DISCOURSE AND 
EXILE POLITICS FROM 1972 TO 1989 
During the period from 1972 to 1989, several important structural and discursive changes 
occurred in the Tibetan exile politics. One of the most important of these changes which can also 
be considered as the first important shift in the Tibetan political discourse was the appropriation 
of Gandhian principles of “nonviolence” by the Dalai Lama. Since 1974, the Dalai Lama has 
waged a nonviolent political campaign which eventually brought him the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1989.The decade of the 1970s also witnessed several political discussions on the Tibetan 
regional/sectarian differences and the issue of citizenship. Furthermore, during the mid-1980s, 
“environmentalism” was integrated in the mainstream Tibetan political discourse and the CTA 
began to promote Tibetan culture and religion as “Green”. These discursive shifts also influenced 
the political practices. The CTA reconfigured its initial departments, developed new governing 
policies such as an identification regime and a taxation system (Green Book/Chatrel) and put 
them into practice. I will claim that through these discursive changes, the Tibetan political 
discourse gained a more religious character in the mid-1970s as compared to the previous period. 
Considering this “religionization” as an important strategic maneuver of the exile elites, this 
chapter will mainly focus on the period from 1972 to 1989 in order to give a detailed analysis of 
the nature of this shift and its instrumentality for the Tibetan political cause. Before starting to 
analyze the discourses and practices, I will start by giving a brief outline of the demographic 
character of the period. 
Demographic Character of the Period 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, during the time of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the 
period from 1966 to 1976, only small numbers of Tibetans arrived in India and Nepal. According 
to Roemer, the restrictive policies of the PRC made the departure difficult for the people who 
wanted to escape concrete political oppression. 140 My own research on the issues of Tibetan 
Review also affirms this argument. The newly arrived Tibetans frequently referred to the Chinese 
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restrictions by saying that: “The movements of Tibetans are strictly restricted and exit permits 
are almost impossible to obtain. 141” 
From 1980 onwards, however, China began granting permission for Tibetans to visit 
India and Nepal. The opening of Sino-Nepali border in particular resulted in a steady flows of 
Tibetans who intended to stay temporarily in India and Nepal.142 Demographer Geoff Childs also 
argues that “many people took advantage of this opportunity to place their children in boarding 
schools run by exiles under the justified belief that they would get a better education than was 
available in Tibet.”143 
In the late 1980s, renewed political turmoil and demonstrations led to a new growth in 
Tibetan migrants. This movement of Tibetans during this period is frequently referred to as the 
second biggest wave of migration. At this time, however, mainly single people were leaving 
Tibet, rather than whole families.144 According to the CTA data, 18,667 Tibetans entered in the 
exile communities between 1986 and 1993, roughly 40 percent of whom were monks and the rest 
consisted of lay adults.145 The demographic data confirm that far more men than women have 
entered in exile communities since the 1980s.146 
The End of Khampa Resistance and the Shift towards Nonviolence 
Finally I told him [Nehru] very firmly that my main concern was twofold: “I am determined to win 
independence for Tibet, but the immediate requirement is to put stop to the bloodshed.” “That is 
impossible” he said in a voice charged emotion. “You say you want independence and in the same breath 
you say you do not want bloodshed. Impossible!”                                                                                                
The Dalai Lama147, Freedom in Exile 
Contrary to popular belief, nonviolence has not always been part of the mainstream Tibetan 
political discourse. Although the Dalai Lama had previously expressed his preference toward a 
nonviolent struggle, it was not until 1974- with the official end of armed resistance in Mustang- 
that the nonviolent political campaign was officially launched. Since then, nonviolence has 
                                                     
141 “Persecution in Tibet Continues, says refugees,” Tibetan Review 8, no. 1&2 (January-February 1973): 15. 
142 Roemer, The Tibetan Government, 60. 
143 Childs, Tibetan Transitions, 156. 
144 Roemer, The Tibetan Government, 60. 
145 Childs, Tibetan Transitions, 157 and Roemer, The Tibetan Government, 61. 
146 Childs, Tibetan Transitions, 157. 
147 His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Freedom in exile (London:  Abacus, 1998), 161. 
38 
 
become one of the most articulated themes of the Tibetan political discourse and it is often 
associated with the fundamental principles of Buddhism. Unsurprisingly, the discourse on 
nonviolence brought important political benefits and the international recognition to the Tibetan 
exile community. The Tibetan discourse on nonviolence became dominant in the late 1980s. 
Particularly in 1987, the Dalai Lama clearly-and globally- articulated nonviolence as the sole 
Tibetan strategy in his Five Point Peace Plan presented to the U.S. Congress.148 Two years later, 
he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize which is considered the most important cultural success 
of the Tibetan political campaign. Regarding this shift towards nonviolence as an important 
turning point in the Tibetan political discourse, this sub-chapter will analyze the historical 
development of the nationalist narrative of nonviolence by seeking an answer to the question of 
why this shift occurred in the mid- 1970s.   
After China crushed the Lhasa Uprisings and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 
1959, Khampa guerillas149 continued the armed resistance in Tibet. In the middle of 1960s the 
Khampas relocated in Mustang in north-west Nepal and Khampa operations persisted in upper 
Mustang region until 1974.150 According to Jane Ardley, there were various reasons for the 
failure of the armed resistance including geographical factors, external factors and internal 
conflict. One of the most important external factors, she asserts, was the withdrawal of the CIA 
support and supply to the guerillas.151 A second and further external pressure on the guerillas 
came from the Nepalese government. After Mao Zedong personally put pressure on King 
Birendra of Nepal, with threats of direct action if the guerilla bases were not destroyed, the 
Nepalese army attacked Mustang’s bases on 1974.152 Nepal started large scale military 
operations to disarm Khampa guerillas. According to the news in Tibetan Review, in 1974, the 
Dalai Lama also urged the Khampas to lay down their arms: 
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The Nepalese government called upon the Khampas to surrender their ammunition and wireless sets with 
them before July 26[…] The Dalai Lama too advised these Khampas to give up their arms and comply with 
the Nepalese Government plans for their resettlement.153 
The Dalai Lama’s call for disarmament was an important step on the path to ending the Mustang 
operations. Most of the Khampas were loyal to the Dalai Lama. After his message arrived, they 
decided to surrender.154  
The Dalai Lama’s earlier stance toward Tibetan armed resistance and Khampa guerillas 
was rather contradictory. On one hand, he occasionally revealed his preference of nonviolence as 
a means of Tibetan struggle. On the other hand, he expressed his sympathy for Khampa guerillas. 
In his autobiography, My Land My People, he addressed his personal and political dilemmas 
regarding violence and resistance:   
I am a steadfast follower of the doctrine of non-violence, a doctrine which was first advocated, among his 
critical teachings, a Lord Buddha, and was practiced in our own times, by the Indian saint and leader 
Mahatma Gandhi. So, from the very beginning I was strongly opposed to any resort to arms as a means of 
regaining our freedom. […]Part of me greatly admired the guerilla fighters. They were brave people, men 
and women, and they were putting their lives and their children’s lives at stake to try to save our religion 
and country in the only remaining way that they could see. When one heard of the terrible deeds of the 
Chinese in the east, it was a natural human reaction to seek revenge.155 
In spite of the Dalai Lama’s contradictory position between violence and nonviolence, it is 
possible to argue that prior to 1974, both he and the CTA did support (most of the time, covertly) 
the Tibetan resistance in its armed defense of Tibet. This official support can be best seen in the 
CTA’s statement in the commemoration of the 13th anniversary of the Lhasa Uprising in 1972: 
[…] The flame of freedom burns bright in the hearts of our courageous compatriots who continue to 
demonstrate repeatedly the indomitable spirit of man and his desire to be free of the alien’s yoke.  The 
Cabinet, on behalf of the Government and those in exile, salute our brave brothers and sisters, and reaffirm 
our pledge to continue the struggle of freedom.156 
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The concomitant failure of the armed resistance, indeed, would be a strong argument to explain 
why the Dalai Lama officially launched a nonviolent political campaign in 1974. However, the 
“natural” end of armed resistance cannot be considered the sole reason of this shift. I will claim 
that the Dalai Lama’s visits to Western countries and his interactions with Western political and 
religious leaders also played an important role in this discursive shift towards nonviolence.  
The Dalai Lama started to travel to Western countries157 at the end of 1973. During these 
visits, he did realize the symbolic importance of the popular Orientalist image of Tibet as a land 
of peace, Shangri-la. In his article, Towards Universal Responsibility, he clearly expressed how 
his European tour provided him with a better understanding of Tibet’s “spiritual superiority”:  
I have learnt a great deal from other peoples during my tour. Tibet was materially backward in the past. But 
spiritually Tibet was very rich. Apart from Buddhism which took deep roots in the country, many great 
ancient sciences, arts and ideas from her neighboring countries found their way into Tibet which gradually 
became a melting pot of great Asian civilizations.158 
Georges Dreyfus also argues that the idea of Tibet as a special place appeared in the Dalai 
Lama’s discourse in a sustained way during the mid-eighties.159 According to Dreyfus, the idea 
of Tibet as a special place seems to have been part of a choice made by the Dalai Lama and his 
entourage concerning the best ways to present Tibetan national struggle on the international 
scene.160 Drawing on Dreyfus’ argument, I assert that in having recourse to the language of 
Orientalism, the Dalai Lama strategically used the discourse on nonviolence to further his own 
political agenda. The following passage from his Five Point Peace Plan which was presented to 
U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus by the Dalai Lama in 1987 is an ample proof of this 
strategy: 
The Tibetan people are eager to contribute to regional and world peace, and I believe they are in a unique 
position to do so. Traditionally, Tibetans are a peace loving and nonviolent people. Since Buddhism was 
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introduced to Tibet over one thousand years ago, Tibetans have practiced nonviolence with respect to all 
forms of life.161 
It is therefore very clear that the essentialist and romanticized representation of Tibetans as 
“natural born peace lovers” has been perpetuated-and reconstructed- by the Dalai Lama and the 
CTA for more favorable international public relations.  
 
Picture 1. The Dalai Lama being awarded Nobel Peace Prize (December 1989). Source: The Office of Tibet, 
New York, USA.162 
The role that Buddhism played in this nonviolent image construction is particularly important 
and it should be discussed in order to comprehend the way in which Tibetan national identity 
was- what I will call-strategically “(re)religionized” during this period. Religion has never been 
totally removed from the mainstream Tibetan political discourse. However, as explained in the 
previous chapter of this thesis, during the first decade of exile, the Dalai Lama introduced 
                                                     
161 His Holiness the Dalai Lama, “Five Point Peace Plan,” The official website of the Office of His Holiness the 14th 
Dalai Lama. 21 September, 1987. http://dalailama.com/messages/tibet/five-point-peace-plan [accessed May, 2012]. 
 
162 Tibet Office, “Biography of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso,“ http://tibetoffice.org/h-h-the-
dalai-lama/biography  [accessed May, 2012]. 
 
42 
 
important political reforms toward secular modernization. Although this secular modernization 
also continued in this period -at least at the institutional level- it is very clear that starting from 
the mid 1970s and early 1980s; Buddhism began to be associated more frequently with Tibetan 
national identity. This “conservative” turn to Buddhism, as previously explained, was mainly 
strategic and intended to meet the expectations of the international Tibet supporters, or to recruit 
new supporters.  
 Similar to the nonviolent Buddhist image, another important theme which was 
strategically adopted by the exile elites and widely promoted as an “essential” component of 
Tibetan Buddhism and thereby “Tibetanness” was environmentalism. It therefore would be 
useful at this point to focus how the Green Tibetan Identity was constructed in relation to the 
Buddhist ethics. 
The Construction of Green Tibetan Identity163: Ecology and Environment in the Tibetan 
Political Discourse 
During the mid-1980s, the image of the “Green Tibetan Buddhist Cultural Identity” began to be 
promoted by the exile elites in a range of publications164 issued by the CTA and the Tibetan 
intellectuals. In these publications Tibetan people, their culture and lifestyle were depicted as 
being in harmony with nature, non-exploitative of the natural world and its resources.165 The 
religious identity and Buddhist philosophy were frequently referred to as the source of “Green 
Tibetan Culture”. Tibetan people were anachronistically portrayed as ecologically aware and 
environmentally sensitive since time immemorial because of their Buddhist faith.  
The Dalai Lama also played a prominent role in the construction and the promotion of 
this “Green Tibetan” image. Starting from 1985, he has published a significant number of articles 
about Buddhism and nature, the global environmental degradation, ecological responsibility and 
so on. It is therefore my intention to consider why and how the image of Green Tibetans 
suddenly came into being in mid-1980s. 
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The global context is particularly important to comprehend the strategic adoption of 
Green identity by Tibetans in mid-1980s. According to Huber, Green Tibet identity should be 
analyzed in relation to the “religious environmentalist paradigm.”166 The paradigm, introduced 
by Poul Pederson, refers to the 1960s environmentalist view that ecological crisis could be 
deduced from an idea that Christianity was a religion that allowed the exploitation of nature 
whereas Asian religions fostered a more ecological approach.167 Huber argues that “within this 
general framework some early environmentalist thinkers became specifically interested in 
connecting Buddhism with ecology.”168 However, until 1985 did neither CTA nor the Dalai 
Lama seem interested in starting an ecological campaign based on Buddhist ethics. Rather, the 
driving force for Tibetan “greening” came from those Western and Tibetan intellectuals who 
suggested to the CTA to become “green” to increase international sympathy for their cause, 
when the reports about environmental destruction in Tibet started to come in.169 
In October 1985, Tibetan and Thai Buddhists initiated a joint project called “Buddhist 
Perception of Nature: A New Perspective for Conservation.”170 The Project was endorsed and 
provided grants by the New York Zoological Society (NYZS) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
branches in the United States and Hong Kong.171 According to the news report in the Tibetan 
Review, there were three mains goals of the project; (1) comprehensive study and assembly of 
traditional Buddhist literature regarding human independence with the responsibilities to the 
earth and living things; (2) design and production of efficient teaching tools; (3) use of the 
educational material in Buddhist influenced communities to achieve better conservation of the 
nature.172  The way in which this project came into being tends to prove that global actors and 
the “religious environmentalist paradigm” played an important role in the process of “greening” 
Tibetans. According to Huber, bringing the CTA within the orbit of the WWF, the project also 
enabled the Tibetan exile elites to join the newly formed global ecological network in 1986.173 In 
the same year, on June 5th, on World Environment day, the Dalai Lama issued a statement 
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entitled “An Ethical Approach to Environmental Protection”.174  Unsurprisingly, the subsequent 
issue of Tibetan Review (July 1986) was dedicated to the ecology. Two articles published in this 
issue, Ecology and Culture in Tibet Today175 and A Tibetan Tragedy176 as well as the editorial 
piece, A Sanctuary for the World177 dramatically mentioned the environmental degradation in 
contemporary Tibet under Chinese rule by constructing “a negative ecologically destructive 
Chinese other.”178 This construction can be clearly seen in the following passage from the 
editorial article:  
The tragedy of Tibet is that barely thirty years ago it was a place where man and nature lived in 
harmony[…] Because of massive deforestation, unprecedented mining and indiscriminate slaughter of 
wildlife by the Chinese-not to mention the unchecked nuclear tests- soon it may be too late. Though there is 
no way of determining exactly eco-system, we can be sure that loss will be irrecoverable.179  
A similar argument was made by the Dalai Lama in his Five Point Peace Plan. The point four of 
the plan was specifically dedicated to the environmental protection: 
Tibetans have a great respect for all forms of life.  This inherent feeling is enhanced by the Buddhist faith, 
which prohibits the harming of all sentient beings, whether human or animal.  Prior to the Chinese 
invasion, Tibet was an unspoiled wilderness sanctuary in a unique natural environment.  Sadly, in the past 
decades the wildlife and the forests of Tibet have been almost totally destroyed by the Chinese.  The effects 
on Tibet's delicate environment have been devastating.  What little is left in Tibet must be protected and 
efforts must be made to restore the environment to its balanced state.180 
Depicting the Chinese as “evil” and solely responsible of Tibet’s environmental degradation was 
indeed a historical distortion181 and highly politicized act. As Huber aptly puts, “the political 
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subtext here is that Tibetans should gain their independence because they would “obviously” do 
a better job maintaining the environment than the Chinese have in the past.182” 
Therefore, as Huber suggests, it is important to recognize the Green Tibetan image as 
“the modern reflexive, politicized and globally valid identity.”183 In this regard, there is no doubt 
that the Green Tibetan image which was produced by the small circle of elite Tibetans primarily 
targeted an international audience. However, it would be an oversimplification to reduce the 
“Green Tibetan image” to an identity marketing strategy. Like all discourses of the Tibetan 
elites, “Green Tibetan image” should also be seen as the part of the Tibetan nation-building 
process. As Dawa Norbu correctly observed “it is this new generation that under the Dalai 
Lama’s influence is projecting democracy, human rights, and environmentalism as constitutive 
of the new Tibetan identity.”184 It perhaps should be added that this new Tibetan identity was 
homogenized by the exile elites at the expense of identities based on the regional and sectarian 
affiliations.  
Criticism of the Sectarian Divisions and the Dalai Lama’s sudden Interest in Tibetan 
Muslims 
As Carole McGranahan eloquently puts it, “the perceived need for internal cohesion, given the 
current political state of Tibet, resulted in devaluing of diversity in the exile community.”185 
Referring to the political importance of “national unity”, the Tibetan political elites criticized the 
sectarian and regional identities which were seen as the major cause of disunity and condemned 
them being divisive and harmful to the Tibetan political cause.186 Unsurprisingly, most of those 
who sought to subsume fractious and regional identities under a homogenous national identity 
were the ones who traditionally held the political power: Lhasa elites and Gelukpa and Sakyapa 
abbots. In this regard, “favored were central Tibetan styles of language and dress, general senses 
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of propriety and comportment, and ideas of class, hierarchy and prestige directly correlated to 
central Tibetan sociopolitical worlds.”187  
  Although the political need of presenting a coherent national identity to the world was 
articulated as the primary objective of the homogenizing efforts of those elites-and to a certain 
extent this was the case-, it is also important to recognize that homogenizing efforts were also 
about controlling and governing the exile population by creating a new common identity of 
“Tibetanness.” Downgrading its differences, the Tibetan exile community has presented itself to 
the world- and to itself-as a harmonious, unified nation. 
In Tibetan Review, the discussion on sectarianism first appeared in 1976. The whole 
September 1976 issue was specifically dedicated to the four traditional sects of Tibetan 
Buddhism as well as pre-Buddhist religion Bon. In his editorial article entitled “Towards 
Sectarian Harmony and National Unity”, Dawa Norbu acknowledges “the political necessity to 
eschew sectarian differences for the sake of national unity.”188 However, Norbu does not suggest 
the elimination of the sectarian identities, he instead favors for the Dalai Lama’s future vision of 
Tibet as a modern plural society; to have unity within diversity.189  What Norbu suggests as a 
solution to the sectarian divisions was to eliminate the political role of the sects-which he saw as 
harmful and dangerous to national unity- and to keep their cultural and religious role the same.190 
Another article published in the same issue, The Diversity and Unity of Four Sects, takes 
Norbu’s position one step further. Writing from a religious point of view, the writer, Jamyang  
Khentse Rinpoche, stresses the common tenets of Tibetan Buddhism and condemns the 
sectarians for misunderstanding Buddhism:  
Sectarian disputes completely agitate and disturb people’s mind, causing great confusion and 
misunderstanding about the Dharma. Holding sectarian views, we ruin both this and future lives by causing 
ourselves and others to have to suffer unfortunate consequences of the non-virtuous act of denying the 
Dharma. As there is no point whatsoever in holding sectarian views, we must all abandon such ideas 
completely and preserve the teachings of the Buddha.191 
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Another article published in May 1977, Religion: a Major Cause of Tibetan Disunity, approaches 
the issue from a political point of view and claims that the national disunity that resulted from 
sectarian clashes was the reason of the Chinese victory: 
The weakest point of Tibet was always disunity.[...] Disunity was easily aggravated by an external enemy 
who could sow discord either among religious leaders of different sects or between two great ecclesiastic 
leaders within one sect, for example the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama.[…]  This article is to remind us 
Tibetans to open our eyes and take note of history. History repeats itself and it should be taken as a guide 
for the future.192 
Based on these aforementioned examples, it is therefore possible to argue that the ultimate 
objective of these critiques of the sectarian affiliations was to create a new sense of belonging, a 
pan-Tibetan national identity which would suppress the traditional-and mostly hostile- regional 
and sectarian identities. As a political project, pan-Tibetanism also sought to include other 
ethnically Tibetan groups, the ones who were usually neglected: Tibetan Muslims. 
Tibetan Muslims were numerically small-a mere 2000 in all, but a group that played a 
significant role in the pre-1959 Tibet’s economy.193 They were predominantly merchants who 
had lived in the big cities of Tibet such as Lhasa, Shigatse and Tsethang.194 After the Chinese 
takeover of Tibet and the Dalai Lama’s flight to India, the Tibetan Muslims also went into exile 
in India. However, in spite of their Tibetan ethnicity, the Tibetan exile community neglected 
them for a long time. They could not benefit from the political and social opportunity structures 
that had been provided their Tibetan Buddhist counterparts. They were only allowed to enter 
India as Indian citizens.195 The Indian Government settled them in the Kashmir region where 
they had to organize themselves to rebuild their community. Interestingly, in the mid- 1975s, the 
sudden interest in the Tibetan Muslims arose within the Tibetan exile community. The Dalai 
Lama began to visit their settlements in Kashmir and several articles which emphasized their 
similarities to the Tibetan Buddhists were published in the Tibetan Review.  
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One of the first reports published about the Tibetan Muslims dated back to 1975 July 
when the Dalai Lama first visited their settlement at Kashmir. This report entitled Dalai Lama 
visits Tibetan Muslim Refugee Camp196 gave detailed information on the Dalai Lama’s trip to 
Kashmir and showed how he attempted to build a relationship with the Tibetan Muslim 
community. The report also mentioned that “the Dalai Lama donated Rs. 10,000 to the Tibetan 
Muslim camp at Idgah.”197 
In April 1976, a special article entitled Tibetan Muslim Refugees in Kashmir was 
published in the Tibetan Review. This article seems interesting in many ways. First of all, the 
title itself implies that Tibetan Muslims were also “refugees” just as Tibetan Buddhists were 
although they entered India as Indian citizens. This emphasis on their refugeehood was indeed a 
political attempt to engage them with Tibetan exile community. Secondly, the article strongly 
stressed that “Tibetan Muslims were thoroughly Tibetan in every other aspect except their 
religion.”198 Thirdly, and more interestingly, it emphasized that “the Dalai Lama has always been 
deeply concerned about the welfare of Tibetan Muslims and has been untiring in his efforts to 
help them.”199 The article concluded with the requests from relief agencies which had been 
supporting Tibetan refugees earlier “not to forget these very hardworking and honest Tibetan 
Muslims who formed an integral part of pre-1959 Tibetan society.”200 
After 1976, however, neither news reports nor articles have been published about the 
Tibetan Muslims until 1990s. The sudden interest in them which arose in the mid-1970s did only 
last a couple of years. This ephemeral interest in Tibetan Muslims can be best explained within 
the broader political climate of the period. It is obvious that during the mid-1970s the Tibetan 
exile elites were attempting to create a pan-Tibetan national identity which would prevail over 
the religious/sectarian and regional identities. However, the global actors who supported-or 
started to support- the Tibetan exile community were interested in the Buddhist Tibetans who 
were imagined as nonviolent, spiritually superior people. The Tibetan elites were very aware that 
the Buddhist identity had symbolic capital which would be transformed into political capital. As 
I argued earlier, this was the reason of the strategic religionization of Tibetan identity after mid-
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1970s. It is therefore possible to argue that the reason behind the Tibetan exile elites’ declining 
interest in Tibetan Muslims was the fact that Tibetan Muslim identity did not fit into the Shangri-
la paradigm. 
The construction of the Tibetan national identity was a highly dynamic process. The 
changes in local and global politics did directly affect this process. This was why some concepts 
and images were integrated to the Tibetan national discourse in specific historical time periods. 
The identification of Tibetan exiles as “citizens” was also the product of such a process.  
The Bhutanese Crisis and the Debate on Citizenship; the Identification Regime of the CTA 
During my research on the issues of the Tibetan Review, I have come across significant number 
of articles and reports written on the “Bhutanese allegations against Tibetan exiles” dating back 
to 1974.  According to the news, twenty- eight Tibetan exiles who had lived in Bhutan were 
arrested and charged with an attempt to assassinate the contemporary Bhutanese king, Jigme 
Singye Wangchuk.201 Moreover, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, Mr. Gyalo Thondup was 
accused of being the mastermind behind the alleged plot.202As expected, the charges against 
Tibetans especially the accusation of the Dalai Lama’s brother created a bomb effect203 in the 
exile community and caused heated public discussion. The immediate reaction of the CTA was 
to deny any Tibetan involvement in the alleged plot and to express their concerns about the 
arrested Tibetans by calling a fair and open trial. According to the press statement issued by 
Mr.Phintso Thonden Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama: 
Under the circumstances we are forced to conclude that the Government of Bhutan has been misled into 
believing that our people took part in such nefarious activities. We, therefore categorically deny any 
Tibetan involvement in the alleged plots in any shape or form.[…] We are confident that in due course our 
people will be vindicated and the dark shadow over the Tibeto-Bhutanese relations will be dissipated by the 
light of truth.204 
However, contrary to the Tibetan wishes to resolve the crisis without harming the relationship 
between Bhutan and the CTA, in the following months, the Bhutanese government had taken 
                                                     
201 “Bhutanese Allegations,” TR 9, no. 4-5 (May-June 1974): 10. 
202 “Bogus or Scapegoat?,” TR 9, no. 4-5 (May-June 1974): 3. 
203  The readers’ letters published in the following issue of the magazine show that the Tibetan people were very 
concerned about the latest developments in Bhutan. Most of these readers referred to the event as a Chinese plot. 
See: “Et Tu Brute (Bhutan),” TR 9, no. 6-7 (July-August 1974): 34-35. 
204 “Tibetan Involvement Denied,” TR 9, no. 4-5 (May-June 1974): 12. 
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aggressive decisions that triggered a new rise in tensions between two governments.  One of 
these decisions was to restrict the Tibetan exiles movements. Accordingly, no Tibetan was 
allowed to go in or come out.205Furthermore, the Bhutanese government came to the conclusion 
that the political loyalty would be resolved once and for all if the Tibetans in Bhutan were 
formally granted Bhutanese citizenship.206 The citizenship issue was raised by the King of 
Bhutan in his meeting with the deputy of the Dalai Lama, Mr. Wangdu Dorjee. During the 
meeting, he clearly stated that the ‘Tibetan refugees in Bhutan should adopt Bhutanese 
citizenship’.207 The rejection of the CTA, said the Bhutanese officials, would make the 
Bhutanese government take other steps unilaterally-namely to disperse the Tibetans in Bhutan 
into different regions.208These statements immediately sparked a big discussion on the question 
of whether Tibetans should adopt Bhutanese citizenship. The CTA declined the Bhutanese offer 
of naturalization on the ground that the acceptance of citizenship by Tibetan exiles in Bhutan 
would seriously weaken their struggle for the liberation of their motherland.209 Similarly, the 
editor of Tibetan Review expressed his thoughts on the issue: 
As exiled people in a free alien country, the Tibetans have a very heavy responsibility of struggling for the 
liberation of their own land and the question of adopting Bhutanese citizenship was totally inconsistent 
with their ultimate goal. 210 
The opposition of the CTA and the Dalai Lama against Tibetans taking host countries citizenship 
was not a new phenomenon.  From the beginning of the exile years, both the CTA and the 
Tibetan exile elites followed a policy of discouraging the Tibetans from adopting Indian 
citizenship despite the fact that the stateless status of the Tibetans placed them under a variety of 
disadvantages with respect to such things as landownership, the acquisition of business licenses 
and the freedom of movement. During his research in 1960s, Goldstein explored that “taking 
Indian citizenship is considered as a renunciation of Tibetan cultural and national aspirations and 
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is actively opposed.”211 In her memoirs, Jetsun Pema, the sister of the Dalai Lama, clearly 
expressed this official position of the CTA: 
Although it was possible for us to opt for Indian nationality, we considered it very important to retain our 
identity so that we should not be forgotten-and to show the world our determination.212 
These examples clearly demonstrate that the exile elites actively encouraged Tibetans to remain 
stateless and therefore to affirm their patriotic commitment to Tibetan nationalism and Tibet’s 
future freedom. In this regard, adopting an “alien” citizenship was perceived as a threat to 
Tibetan national unity which was seen as the very reason of the exile existence. As Fiona 
McConnell correctly put it, ‘Tibetan population was perceived [by the Tibetan political elites] as 
having series of interlinked and distinct purposes: as a “resource” which needs to be preserved; 
as a population-in-waiting ready to return to govern a future Tibet; and as a cultural repository, 
preserving a unified Tibetan national identity outside the home territory.213 Under the given 
circumstances, the CTA needed to identify, label and document the Tibetan population as 
‘Tibetan citizens’. It may indeed be useful in this point to focus on the CTA’s identification 
regime, materialized form of Tibetan citizenship; rangzen lagteb or “Green Book”. 
 Through its identification regime, the CTA sought to “monopolize legitimate symbolic 
force which includes the power to name, to identify, to categorize”214 what is Tibetanness and 
who is ‘Tibetan’. The CTA developed a formalized notion of Tibetan citizenship, the definitions, 
criteria, rights, and duties of which are enshrined in the Draft Constitution of 1963 and the 
Charter of Tibetans in Exile of 1991.215According to the charter, Tibetan citizenship is granted 
to; “All Tibetans born within the territory of Tibet and those born in other countries shall be 
eligible to be citizens of Tibet. Any person whose biological mother or biological father is of 
Tibetan descent has the right to become a citizen of Tibet”.216 The rights of such Tibetan citizens 
include equality before the law; religious freedom; freedom to life, liberty, and property; 
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freedom of speech and expression; and freedom of movement and association.217 Under the 
article 13 of the Charter : 
all Tibetans shall fulfill the following obligations:  
(a) bear true allegiance to Tibet; 
(b) faithfully comply and observe the Charter and the laws enshrined therein; 
(c) endeavor to achieve the common goal of Tibet; 
(d) pay taxes imposed in accordance with the laws; 
(e) perform such obligations as may be imposed by law in the event of a threat to the interest of Tibet.218 
It is indeed possible to recognize one reiterated theme of the Tibetan political discourse in these 
statutes of Tibetan citizenship: “to endeavor to achieve the common goal of Tibet” which was 
defined as one of the primary obligations of a Tibetan citizen clearly refers to the theme of 
“returning back to homeland.” Once more, the CTA reminds Tibetans their duties for “the future 
free Tibet”. In a similar manner, “bearing true allegiance to Tibet” clearly implies that there is 
one ‘true’ way of being patriotically Tibetan, the way defined by the CTA.  
Moreover, Tibetan citizenship was materialized in a pseudo-passport, the rangzen lagteb 
or “Green Book,” and the annual payment of voluntary contributions to Tibetan Government-in-
exile. (chatrel system).219 The rangzen lagteb and chatrel system were initiated by a group of 
exile Tibetan in 1972 under the auspices of the Tibetan Freedom Movement220 with the rationale 
of encouraging Tibetans to make a financial contribution to the running of their government, 
thereby expressing their loyalty to the CTA.221  
Considering the fact that the CTA has not been recognized as a “state”, it is clear that its 
citizenship regime has mainly symbolic significance. However, it would be an oversimplification 
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to reduce this practice to a mere political symbol. Rather, holding rangzen lagteb did (and does) 
bring important material benefits to the exile community. The material benefits of holding 
rangzen lagteb can be listed as being eligible for the jobs in the CTA, benefiting from Tibetan 
welfare stipends and voting in Tibetan elections.222   
How then one should interpret the citizenship regime of the CTA with all its 
complications? A couple of interrelated answers can be given to this question. First of all, it is 
important to note that no universal identity document existed in pre-1959 Tibet, and Tibetan 
passports were only introduced in 1947 and issued by the Lhasa government to just four Tibetan 
diplomats.223 It is therefore clear that as a unifying marker of Tibetan identity, Tibetan 
citizenship was part of broader exilic nation-building process and Tibetan modernization. In a 
similar manner, the statutes of citizenship rights such as ‘equality before law’, ‘freedom of 
religion, speech and movement’ and voting in Tibetan elections can be related to the Dalai 
Lama’s efforts toward democratization. There is also no doubt that adopting such a modern 
Western model of citizenship would strengthen the CTA’s position in the international political 
arena. The introduction of Tibetan citizenship regime, however, should also be linked with the 
previous discussion on the CTA’s opposition to Tibetans taking host countries’ citizenship. As 
Goldstein argues, ‘a consequence of the CTA’s policy [its opposition against Tibetans adopting 
Indian citizenship] was the greater independence of the Tibetan exiles on the CTA’.224 Following 
Goldstein’s argument, it is possible to claim that the Tibetan citizenship regime was also about to 
control the Tibetan exile population rendering them dependent on the institutions of the CTA.  
Conclusion 
Based on the analyses done in this chapter, it is therefore possible to argue that the period from 
1972 to 1989 was a milestone in the development of Tibetan nationalism because an important 
shift toward non-violence campaign which brought unprecedented global support to Tibetan 
exiles occurred in this period. Focusing on this shift, the beginning of this chapter sought an 
answer to the question why non-violence campaign suddenly came into being in early 1970s and 
not before? It is suggested that the natural end of Khampa resistance could only partially answer 
this question. When the period was scrutinized in detail, it was clearly seen that the Dalai Lama 
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and the Tibetan exile elites’ close contacts with the Western world played a fundamental role not 
only in the initiation of non-violence campaign but also in the “invention” of “Green” Tibetan 
image. It is claimed that in this particular period, the Dalai Lama and other important figures of 
Tibetan exile community started to realize the importance of the symbolic power of  Shangri-la 
image which, they might have thought, would have provided the global support to their political 
agenda which is what they needed most to be able to struggle against the PRC. Indeed, the 
integration of the theme of “non-violence” in early 1970s and “environmentalism” in 1980s to 
the mainstream Tibetan nationalist discourse were considered in this context. As mentioned 
throughout the chapter, the sudden increase of non-violent discourse and the subsequent 
“invention” of “Green” Tibetan identity were regarded as strategic moves which were mainly 
targeted at the global actors. Expectedly, Tibetan elites frequently-and systematically- associated 
both of these themes with the essence of Tibetan Buddhist teachings, thereby the “natural” 
character of Tibetan “nation”. However, when Tibetan Buddhism gained a new  importance in 
the construction of the global image of Tibet with the (re)religionization of Tibetan identity at 
discursive level, at the same time, the Dalai Lama and the CTA sought to produce a  modern 
Tibetan nation with the secular norms they introduced e.g. the citizenship regime and tax system.  
This tension- or as one may call “paradox”- between the discourse and the practice, religion and 
secular modernity revealed once more the idiosyncratic character of Tibetan nationalism. 
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CHAPTER IV. TIBETAN NATIONALIST DISCOURSE SINCE 1989 
In the years following the Dalai Lama’s Nobel Peace Prize award in 1989, the Tibetan exile 
community garnered unprecedented global support and made the communities around the world 
aware of the plight of Tibetans in the Chinese controlled Tibet. The year 1991, specifically, was 
the watershed year for the global political campaign for Tibet. In this year, collaborating with the 
department of religion and culture of the CTA, the Tibet House US225 initiated the International 
Year of Tibet as a “worldwide celebration of Tibetan culture.”The international year of Tibet 
was a huge marketing campaign; several Tibet-related art exhibitions were made, Tibetan dance 
performances conducted, political and the religious speeches given, demonstrations held and the 
story of Tibet broadcast widely and loudly.226 Although this “Global Tibet movement” did not 
have any positive impact on the Chinese policies over Tibet-on the contrary, it led Chinese 
government to tighten control over Tibetan regions- it was highly instrumental in discrediting the 
Chinese government in the eyes of thousands of people all over the world. Furthermore, the year 
1991 was also witnessed the establishment of Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organization 
(UNPO), an international organization of political groups and governments representing self-
proclaimed “indigenous peoples, minorities and unrecognized or occupied territories.”227 
Together with the “World Uyghur Congress”228 the CTA became one of the founding members 
of the organization at a ceremony held at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands. As 
expected, the mainstream Tibetan political discourse was also directly influenced by this new 
wave of global support. While the previously introduced themes and concepts such as non-
violence, democracy, human rights and environmentalism have remained dominant, couple of 
new themes such as “gender equality” and “vegetarianism” was also integrated to the 
mainstream discourse in order to adapt to the transnational requirements of the globalized world 
order. Locating Tibet [local] into the global, this chapter intends to scrutinize the period from 
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1989 up to the present day and analyze how Tibetan nationalist discourse took its current form. 
Since the contemporary migration patterns and the creation of Tibetan diaspora in the West 
played a crucial role in the nationalist discourse of the period, this chapter will begin with the 
detailed analysis of the CTA’s population politics.  
Demographic Character of the Period: Population Censuses of 1998 and 2009 and the 
CTA’s population Politics 
Owing to the two extensive demographic surveys done by the CTA during the last two decades 
of the exile, the demographic data for the period from 1998 up to the present day provide a much 
more accurate picture of the Tibetan exile community than the previous periods. In 1998, the 
CTA conducted the first extensive population census and demographic survey of the Tibetan 
exile community. Adopting the standardized state census format, the CTA planned to repeat the 
surveys in every ten years. Accordingly, the second demographic survey was planned to take 
place in June 2008. However, due to the widespread political unrest occurred in Tibet in the 
spring 2008 as a reaction to coming Beijing Olympics the second census was postponed until 12 
April 2009. These two population censuses were indeed important developments toward the 
modernization of the Tibetan exile “state”. It can be suggested that through these extensive 
demographic surveys, the CTA attempted to make its community “legible” and to arrange the 
population in ways that simplified the state functions- or in this case, “state-like” functions. This, 
of course, does not mean that the CTA did not seek to count and to “read” its exile population 
prior to this period. On the contrary, until 1998, “the CTA’s collected information about the 
Tibetan exile population through a range of ad hoc surveys and registration systems including the 
documentation of “newcomer” migrants by the CTA reception centers in Kathmandu, Delhi and 
Dharamsala, and the administration of the CTA issued Green Book identity documents.”229 
However, the first population census of the Tibetan exile community of South Asia230 conducted 
in 1998 under the auspices of the CTA was the first systematic attempt to count the entire exile 
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population in India and Nepal in order to regulate the health, identity and mobility of Tibetan 
“citizens” in these countries.  
According to the first census data (see table 1), there were approximately 100,000 
Tibetans living in the thirty settlements dispersed in India and Nepal, with the majority living in 
India (85,147) and a relatively small number living in Nepal (13,720). The data also indicates 
that the Tibetan settlements were scattered across the Indian sub-continent and continued to be 
the primary places of residence for most of the exile population.231 Unsurprisingly, the Tibetan 
settlements in North, South and East India, the regions where Tibetans were resettled by the GOI 
at the beginning of the exile years were much more densely populated than the settlements in 
Central and Western India. Additionally, the data shows that in 1998, two urbanized areas in 
Nepal, Kathmandu and Pokhara, accommodated the majority232 of the Tibetan exile population 
of Nepal. 
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Table 2:  Tibetan Exile Population of South Asia by Region and Major Settlements, 1998233 
Region (States within Region) Major Settlements 
Settlement 
Populations 
Regional and Total 
Population 
Dhramsala  8,694 
North India 
Ladakh(2 
settlements) 6,839 
(Delhi, Haryana Himachal Pradesh, Bir (4 settlements) 3,224 
Jamnu and Kashmir, Rajasthan) Kullu/Manali  1,934 28,522 
Shimla 1,594 
Delhi 1,553 
  Dalhousie 1,043   
Mussorie 2,654 
Central India Dehradun 1,962 
(Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh Mainpat 1,417 9,722 
Rajpur 1,362 
Clement Town 1,035 
        
Western India Bhandara 966 1,235 
(Gujarat, Maharashtra) 
        
Eastern India Darjeeling 2,455 
(Orissa, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Orissa 2,259 
Meghalaya, Nagaland, Sikkim, Gangtok 2,217 18,058 
West Bengal) Kalimpong 2,141 
Miao 2,066 
Bomdila 1,499 
        
Bylakuppe(2 
settlements) 10,727 
South India Mungod 8,583 18,058 
(Andhra Pradesh,Karnataka,  Kollegal 4,359 
Tamil Nadu) Hunsur 2,935 
Nepal Kathmandu 9,620   
Pokhara 2,665 13,720 
TOTAL     98,869 
 
                                                     
233 Source: Planning Council 2000a. This table was originally published by the CTA’s planning comission based on 
the results of the population census 1998.  This version used here is taken from: Childs, Tibetan Transitions, 138. 
59 
 
Figure 1: Age Sex Composition of the Tibetan Exile Population in South Asia, 1998 
 
Source: 1998 TDS. This table is originally published by the CTA based on the results of the Tibetan 
demographic survey.  This version used here is taken from: Childs, Tibetan Transitions, 156. 
With regard to the sex-age composition of the exile population in 1998 (see figure 1), among the 
younger age groups, particularly those 10-34, men heavily outnumbered the women. According 
to Childs, this imbalance can be explained by the recent migration patterns which show that 
Tibetans entered in exile communities from Tibet after the mid-1980s were mostly monks who 
escaped the Chinese crackdowns on religion in order to attend the monastic schools in exile.234 
Childs also argues that in 1998 about 22 percent (11,067) of the male population in exile was 
monks, while only three percent (1,230) of the female population was nuns.235 Although this data 
suggest that monasticism played an important population regulating role in exile with regard to 
the celibacy oath was taken by  monks and nuns, the sex ratio data (table 2) show that after 
eliminating monks and nuns from the population, there were slightly more laywomen than 
laymen of marriageable age. 236 Table 2 also suggests that in 1998 the younger age groups were 
mostly composed of those who were born in exile rather than the “newcomers.” Although the 
first population census and the demographic survey gave valuable information about the Tibetan 
exile population in South Asia including the family systems, the fertility and mortality rates and 
the marriage patterns, it was not as extensive as the second survey was taken in 2009.  
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Table 3: Sex Ratios by Age, Tibetan Exiles 1998 
  Sex Ratio (Males per 100 Females) 
age All 
exiles 
Excluding Monks and 
Nuns 
Born in Exile, Excluding Monks and 
Nuns 
15-19 120 97 90 
20-24 153 96 92 
25-29 159 98 89 
30-34 138 98 92 
35-39 108 90 84 
Source: Planning Council 1998. This table is originally published by the Planning Council of the CTA based 
on the results of the Tibetan Demographic Survey. This version used here is taken from: Childs, Tibetan 
Transitions, 163. 
The initial results of the second demographic survey were published in December 2010. The 
survey found that the total population of Tibetans outside of Tibet –including not only the 
Tibetans who live in South Asia both also in North America, Europe and Australia- as on 12 
April 2009, reached 127,938 composed of 70,556 men and 57, 379  women.237 Of the total 
population recorded, 94,203 Tibetans were living in India, 13,514 in Nepal, 1,298 in Bhutan and 
18,920 elsewhere around the world.238According to the table published in the website of the CTA 
(see table 3), 53% of the Tibetan exile population of South Asia was unemployed. The data 
suggests that only 17% of the unemployed population was seeking job during the time of survey. 
This strongly indicates that most of the unemployed Tibetan exiles were either monks or nuns. 
The effective literacy rate of Tibetan exile population of South Asia (82.4%) was quite high, 
especially compared to the host countries: India (74.4%)239, Nepal (45.2%)240 and Bhutan 
(52.8%).241 This relatively high literacy provides clear evidence of the success of national 
education policy of the CTA.  
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Table 4. Snapshots data of Tibetan Demographic Survey 1998 & 2009 Snapshots data of Tibetan 
Demographic Survey 1998 & 2009 
Variables TDS 1998* TDS 2009 Decadal Changes
GENERAL    
Population 98,867** 109,015 15,929 (14.6%)
Male 51,059 
(55.8%)
60,599 (55.5%) 9,540 (0.3%)
Female 40,443 
(44.1%)
48,416 (44.4%) 7,973 (0.3%)
Sex ratio (males/1000 
females) 
126 125 -1
Age-dependency ratio 53% 41% -12%
AGE GROUP    
Age-group    
0 – 14 23,122 20,302 -2,820
15 – 64 59,648 75,031 15,383
65 & above 8,584 10,700 2,116
Age not clear/stated 148 2,982 2,834
HEALTH INDICATORS    
Crude Birth Rate (CBR) 7.83 8.99 1
Crude Death Rate (CDR) 8.78 9.7 1
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) 38.9 15.44 -59%
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 1.22 1.18 -0.04
Total Marital Fertility Rate 
(TMFR) 
2.75 3.6 0.85
LITERACY     
General literacy rate (%) 61.6% 71.4% 10%
Effective literacy rate (%) 74.5% 82.4% 7.9%
WORKFORCE    
Workforce population (15 – 
64 years) 
   
Main workers (%) 20,928 (35%) 27,540 (39%) 6,612 (4%)
Marginal workers (%) 604 (1%) 5,525 (8%) 4,921 (7%)
Non-workers non-seeking 
jobs (%) 
33,923 (57%) 30,651 (44%) 3,272 (-13%)
Non-workers seeking jobs 4,193 (7%) 6,104 (9%) 1,911 (2%)
 
Notes: TDS ’98 was conducted only for Tibetans in India and Nepal whereas TDS ’09 includes Bhutan (pop: 
1,298)** Household population. Population as per individual questionnaire was: 91,502. 
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The second survey report also estimates that there was significant growth of Tibetan population 
in the countries outside South Asia and over 9,309 Tibetans who had previously lived in India 
and Nepal moved to the Western countries during 1998-2009.242 However, the demographic data 
about those who live outside of South Asia were rather inaccurate because of the low 
participation rate in the population census conducted in these countries. Dr. Kunchok Tsondue, 
the Chief Planning Officer of the CTA, pointed out this problem in the interview he gave to 
Phayul, the website created in 2001 by the Tibetan exiles in India: 
In India, Nepal and Bhutan where the majority of Tibetan exiles live, not more than 5 percent of the 
population had missed the survey. However, a sizeable population elsewhere, especially in the west, either 
did not participate or have missed the survey owing to a number of factors such as adopting citizenship of a 
host country or being in the process of becoming neutralized citizen of a host country.243 
The CTA’s attempt of including the Tibetans who live outside of South Asia in the population 
census was indeed a politically motivated act and it needs to be discussed here. Regarding this 
policy, it is possible to argue that the CTA sought to strengthen its relationship with its own 
“diaspora” in the West which was seen as an important group that could bring political and 
economic benefits to the exile community in South Asia. Tibetan diaspora in the West formed in 
1970s when the Tibetan exile population in South Asia started to migrate to  Western countries 
including Switzerland, Belgium, U.S and Australia. Since the Tibetan migration to the West has 
been regulated by the CTA based on the bilateral agreements made between the CTA and the 
receiving countries, the CTA has been the main authority that selected the candidates for 
emigration. It is clear that the main purpose of the CTA to encourage and to regulate the 
migration to the West was to create a Tibetan community that would influence the global 
audience about the Tibetan plight. How the CTA instilled the sense of “national” responsibility 
and patriotism in those Tibetans who migrated to the West can be best seen in the following 
statement of the CTA in 1972: 
We remind fellow Tibetans settled abroad that each of them is an ambassador and a spokesman for our 
people and country.[...]They are members of Tibetan society and not as individuals. […]They have an 
equal responsibility and stake in the future of Tibet.244 
                                                     
242 Tinley, Planning Commission. 
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244 Tibetan Review, Kashag Statement, 10. 
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When the activities of the current Tibetan community in the West was taken into consideration, it 
is possible to argue that most of these small Tibetan communities in the West have remained 
loyal to the Tibetan cause and  within them important pro-Tibetan activist movements occurred.  
 
 
Picture 2. Protest rally and political theatre in front of the White House organized by the Tibetan population 
in U.S. on the day of Xi Jinping's visit to Washington DC. Feb 14, 2012. Source: The non-profit organization, 
“Students For a Free Tibet.” 
However, it should be noted that these pro- Tibetan political movements did not always agree 
with the Dalai Lama’s and CTA’s official position. One of the most important political divisions 
concerning the Tibetan political cause occurred at the beginning of 1990s after the Dalai Lama 
articulated his preference toward “a genuine Tibetan autonomy” which is also known as “Middle 
Way Approach” in his statement issued in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 15 June 
1988.  The first and perhaps the strongest reaction to this middle way approach came from the 
Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), one of the largest and perhaps most influential organizations of 
Tibetan exiles, which demands “complete independence of Tibet even at the cost of one’s life.”It 
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is important to note that despite their dissident position, the leaders of the TYC never openly 
criticized the Dalai Lama himself. However, they have been outspoken critics of the CTA’s 
parliament members, which brought them into conflict with governing elites.  Interestingly, these 
contemporary political divisions in the Tibetan exile community did hardly affect the global 
image of “Tibetan unity.” On the contrary, Tibetan political elites kept portraying Tibetan exile 
community as a harmonious and unified group. In a similar manner, the new themes which were 
simultaneously integrated to the Tibetan nationalist discourse in this period were also propagated 
with a strong reference to the Tibetan “national unity.”  
The Myth of Gender-equal Tibet: Women in the Tibetan Nationalist Discourse 
Starting from the mid-1990s, Tibetan exile elites wrote extensively on women as a part of their 
nationalist discourse within which they (re)constructed the role and the image of the Tibetan 
women. Although these writings on women were very diverse and the authors expressed their 
thoughts on several gender-related topics, a few common themes stand out in all writings and 
they deserved special attention. Almost without exception, all the writings portrayed pre-1951 
Tibetan society as “gender equal” society with a strong emphasis that “traditionally Tibetan 
women enjoyed a higher social status than their counterparts in many other societies.” Similar to 
the “Green Tibetan identity” construction, the image of gender-equal Tibetan society was also 
politicized by constructing a negative, misogynistic Chinese other. It is interesting to note that 
the gender equal Tibet image started to be widely articulated when the debate over whether or 
not Tibetan women organizations should attend to the UN women’s conference in Beijing broke 
out in 1995.  
In Tibetan Review, the first article about the UN women’s conference appeared in May 
1995. In his editorial piece, Food for Thought, Tsering Wangyal criticized Tibetan women 
organizations for insisting to attend the conference instead of boycotting it: 
[…] The seemingly- abundant resources [Tibetan women organizations have] could have been better 
directed towards preventing Peking from hosting the conference at all or, if unsuccessful in this towards 
making at least the non –governmental organizations boycott it. […]Begging to be allowed in the 
forthcoming conference implies acceptance of Peking as a reasonable choice for venue. This in turn would 
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mean that Tibetans still standing in the queue think the Chinese are not guilty of any crime against 
women.245 
Three months later, in September issue, Tsering Wangyal wrote another polemical article, 
Gender Bender, which again harshly criticized Tibetan women’s organizations that finally 
managed to get permission to attend to the UN conference condemning them “misportraying” 
Tibetan society:  
I could never understand why the small but organization-ridden and bureaucracy-infested Tibetan society 
needs a separate organization for women. Now, before Tibetan women of various shapes and sizes decide 
to descend on me with an assortment of kitchen tools, let me explain further. I have full respect for women, 
some of whom are my friends.[…] The interests of women are represented as much as of any other sections 
of the society by the Tibetan government and other organizations. […] The Tibetan cause is the cause of all 
Tibetans, not exclusively of Tibetan men or the Tibetan women. […]I am sure any foreigner unfamiliar 
with our story will automatically assume when hearing about something called Tibetan Women’s 
Association that Tibetan women must be a downtrodden lot in their own society, most probably kept 
chained indoors, barred from political and all other activities except cooking producing children. This being 
far from the case, an organization like TWA actually gives a wrong image of the Tibetan society.246 
From a feminist point of view, the article was obviously sexist. Although the writer claimed that 
he had “full respect” for women, he did not see any problem to confine them to the “kitchen.” 
Moreover, both of his statements, “there is no needs for a Tibetan women organization” and 
“Tibetan women degrade their own society in the eyes of foreigners because they organize 
themselves as a separate entity”, were very problematic and gender-biased. The clear implication 
behind these arguments was that by identifying themselves with their gender, Tibetan women did 
harm “national unity” and the Tibetan political cause.  
Concurrently with this discussion about the UN conference, the Women’s issue desk at 
the CTA’s department of Information and International Relations prepared a national report on 
Tibetan Women “to document the conditions of Tibetan women inside occupied Tibet as well as 
in exile.”247This report was interesting in many ways. First of all, it did not only contrast the 
status of the Tibetan women in Tibet with their counterparts in exile, but it also strongly 
                                                     
245 Tsering Wangyal, “Food for Thought,” Tibetan Review 30, no.5 (May 1995): 3. 
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247  Tibetan Studies WWW Virtual Library, “National Report on Tibetan Women,” 
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emphasized that “unlike their Chinese counterparts Tibetan women were never subjected to the 
gender discrimination or violent traditions such as foot binding, veiling, dowry or concubinage”:  
Traditionally, Tibetan women enjoyed a higher social status than their counterparts in many other societies. 
They also played an active part in the affairs of family and society. Since the occupation of Tibet by 
Chinese military forces, Tibetan women have suffered oppression, exploitation, subjugation and 
discrimination [….] Tibetan women in exile also suffered as a result of displacement and dislocation of 
normal life. However, in comparison with those in Tibet, women in exile enjoyed equal opportunity in 
education and job. They were given special consideration in political representation to encourage greater 
role in public affairs.[….] The women in Tibet enjoy none of the human rights and freedom that are taken 
for granted in exile.248 
Furthermore, the second article of the report, The Status of women before the Chinese 
occupation, was specifically dedicated to the history of Tibetan women- but not Tibetan 
women’s history- in order to prove the argument that “Tibetan society has always been gender-
equal.” It would be noteworthy giving a couple of examples from this article: 
In the annals of Suishu and T'ang shu-Sui and T'ang dynasty (around the second century AD), there is a 
reference to the existence of a "women's kingdom" in southeastern Tibet. In this kingdom, the society is 
described as being matriarchal and matrilineal where political power appeared to have been in the hands of 
women. Matriliny is also suggested in a Tibetan text of aphorisms from Tun-huang that may be connected 
to a female-dominated society of the fifth century Sum-pa people. In Tibetan history one also finds that 
there were times when certain individual women played prominent roles in determining the social 
development of the Tibetan nation. The mothers of the Tibetan emperors in the period between the seventh 
and the ninth centuries AD, for instance, are believed to have played active roles in the polity of the state.249 
There is no doubt that this attempt of drawing historical line of “continuity” between Tibetan 
ancient-medieval past and today with regard to women’s status was a part of Tibetan nation 
building process. The emphasis on “the prominent roles women played in the development of 
Tibetan nation” was an ample proof of this nationalist aspiration. The report’s claim that Tibetan 
society had historically been matriarchal and “women dominated” went even further in the 
following paragraph of the same article which asserted that “by looking at the patterns of 
marriage and household organization, one can gain an insight into the traditional position of 
women in Tibetan society”: 
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Marriage arrangements included monogamous, polyandrous and polygamous alliances. Divorce and 
remarriage (including widow marriage) were acceptable. Polygamy was just as common as polyandry, 
though both were by no means widespread. They were accepted in some regions to sustain family and 
social networks and to keep estates undivided, without infringing the rights to which men and women were 
accustomed. Arranged marriages were the norm but only the daughter, upon marriage, would remain with 
her family. Her husband would enter her family. Then, upon the death of the household head, the daughter, 
and not her husband, would head the family estate.250 
The emphasis on polyandry and polygamy as signifiers of the women’s status in the past Tibetan 
society was indeed interesting and it should be elaborated further on. Tibetan polyandry has long 
been subject of academic inquiry and many prominent Tibet scholars discussed about the 
polyandric practices251 both in traditional and contemporary Tibetan societies. Although 
polyandry is frequently regarded as a rarely practiced phenomenon, many scholars agreed that it 
was a “characteristic marker”252 of Tibetan identity. But what does polyandric marriage pattern 
show about the traditional status of Tibetan women? Does it really mean that Tibetan society was 
traditionally matriarchal and “women dominated”? According to Goldstein and Nellie, the 
polyandric marriage pattern was little about the gender equality or women’s dominancy in the 
society; it was rather product of the material considerations; “a practice derived from rules of 
land tenure and semi-feudal politico-economic system.”253 
 Moreover, the Tibetan women’s traditional status in society was inferior and subordinate 
to men. Women were often associated with “danger” and “pollution” because of the menstrual 
blood.254 As Carole McGranahan states, in Buddhist Tibet the women clearly signaled disorder 
and the female body was considered dangerous to cultural and spiritual order.255 In a similar 
manner, Tibetan monastic tradition was also highly patriarchal and with few exceptions, women 
hardly attained higher religious status. According to Kapstein, “women who excelled within the 
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Tibetan religious world were often associated with the orders and lineages that emphasized 
practical mastery of ritual and meditation rather than the scholastic dimensions of Buddhist 
formal learning.”256 In spite of this well-known discrimination against women in the monastic 
institutions, the report argued oppositely: 
Buddhism played a significant role in the lives of Tibetan women. Although the number of monks is 
greater than that of nuns, becoming a nun provided an alternative and positive role for women in society. 
Becoming a nun was a matter of choice. Prior to 1959, there were 270 nunneries with over 15,600 nuns 
throughout Tibet. Besides, many nuns lived in small groups in retreat communities or hermitages.257 
In her autobiography, the Dalai Lama’s sister, Pema Jetsun affirmed “the frustrations 
encountered by Tibetan women desiring to teach Buddhism” but she also added that “religion is 
the only area where women are not considered equal to men.”258 In all other areas of social life, 
she claimed, Tibetan women enjoyed a much higher social position than their counterparts in 
China and India:   
As a general rule, Tibetan women have always held a high social position. It was perhaps less high than 
that demanded by feminist movements in Western countries, but better than in many Asian countries. Thus, 
even though the traditional structure of Tibetan society was patriarchal, women’s feet were never bandaged 
as they were in China. In the same way, cases of female infanticide, such as those in India, were unknown.  
The position of Tibet women’ is on par with their exceptionally independent character- they are free 
economically, and have their own property which makes divorce easy.259 
It is therefore very clear that a gender-equal Tibet image was a product of small group of 
educated Tibetan elites who skillfully reinvented the traditional role of Tibetan women and 
manipulated it for their own nationalist political agenda. It is interesting to note that this 
essentialized image of “exceptionally independent Tibetan women” has also been appropriated 
by Tibetan women intellectuals and organizations without further questioning or criticizing. If it 
is obvious that Tibetan society has never been a gender-equal society as the Tibetan elites 
promoted, why then neither intellectual Tibetan women nor Tibetan women organizations did 
challenge this image? To answer this question, it would be useful to recall the way in which 
Tibetan regional and sectarian identities were subsumed under a homogenized Tibetan identity. 
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As I discussed in the previous chapter, referring to the political need for “national unity”, Tibetan 
mainstream discourse did in fact suppress the dissident voices in exile community. In this regard, 
I venture to suggest that alternative articulations of gender were also suppressed by the 
mainstream discourse for the sake of national unity. 
Non-violence, Ecology and Vegetarianism: Tibetan Vegetarian Movement in 21st Century 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Dalai Lama and the CTA launched a campaign for a 
“vegetarian Tibetan society” to encourage the Tibetan exile population to embrace a vegetarian 
life-style. As a part of the campaign, several prominent religious and secular leaders of the 
Tibetan exile community delivered speeches to promote vegetarian diet as healthier, ethical and 
environmental friendly option. Moreover, in a range publications issued by the exile authorities 
and religious leaders during this period, vegetarianism was represented as an essential and 
fundamental component of the Tibetan religious identity; something has always been there in the 
Buddhist teachings. Drawing parallel line between Tibetan Buddhist teachings and 
vegetarianism, the image of “vegetarian Tibetans” has been successfully disseminated around the 
world. Suggesting that Tibetan vegetarian movement was central to the discourse of nationalism, 
herein, I will briefly address two interrelated questions: (1) why and how Vegetarian movement 
was launched by Tibetan exile elites? And (2) what visions of Tibetan population did the 
discourse of vegetarianism generate?260    
In Tibetan Review, the first articulations of the vegetarian campaign appeared at 1995. In 
July issue, a small news report, Moving towards Vegetarianism was published. According to the 
report, “the south zone office of the central Tibetan relief committee of India organized a 
workshop on food and nutrition in Bangalore to carry out the wishes of the Dalai Lama who 
asked Tibetans ‘to turn more towards vegetarianism’.” 261 Although the report did only briefly 
mention that the Dalai Lama expressed his wishes for a more vegetarian Tibetan society during 
his teachings in India, it is possible to locate 1995 as the year when the idea of vegetarianism 
started to be circulated in the Tibetan community. Two years later, vegetarianism turned into a 
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social campaign with the establishment of a charitable organization, “Universal Compassion 
Movement.” (UCM)  
The UCM was founded by a Geshe Thupten Phelgye, an important Buddhist Lama of 
Gelukpa tradition and current member of Tibetan Parliament in exile, with the twin task of 
creating awareness about animal rights and promoting vegetarianism around the world.262 In his 
primary article about the mission of UCM, an appeal for Compassion, Phelgye stated that 
“Buddha taught about the benefits of following a vegetarian life-style and eating meat is contrary 
to one’s inherent Buddha nature which is, in essence, a love for all sentiment beings.”263 In 1999, 
Phelgye furthered his vegetarian mission by bringing up a resolution on vegetarianism for all 
Geluk monasteries and nunneries which was successfully passed and declared implementation of 
the conduct around his sect.264   
Tibetan vegetarian movement gained a new momentum in 2003 when “Geshe Phelgye 
brought up a bill in Parliament in exile to encourage vegetarianism in Tibetan communities for 
compassionate living and for the long life of the Dalai Lama which was successfully passed in 
the House.”265 In addition, Tibetan parliament in exile also decided to celebrate the year 2004 as 
“Tibetan Vegetarian Year.”  
Concurrently, a civil organization called “Tibetans for Vegetarian society” was 
established by Tenzin Kunga Luding, with a mission “to bring about vegetarianism in the 
Tibetan society.”266 Embracing both the language of religion and science- particularly nutritional 
sciences- the organization introduced the importance of vegetarian food not only in preventing 
death of animals but also in enhancing a “healthy” life. In the interview he gave to Phayul, 
Luding stated that: 
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I realized that these foods (eggs, meat, and animal dairy products) were not only causing so much of 
unnecessary sufferings to animals but were harmful to our precious health and environment as well. […]On 
the whole I think there is some awareness to remain healthy seeped in the minds of our people and we must 
continue to follow in the same direction.267 
In 2005, in his speech to newly arrived Tibetans from Tibet to New Delhi, the Dalai Lama also 
addressed the importance of consuming more vegetarian food not only for ethical/religious 
reasons but also for a “longer and healthier life”: 
Less meat consumption means good health. I knew a monk in America who often consumed meat, as well 
as lots of cream. All of a sudden he succumbed to death from a heart attack. This example is a profound 
lesson that we should take care of our diets. Despite its purported good taste, too much fat is harmful to our 
health.268 
The idea that “the vegetarian diet is much healthier than the non-vegetarian diet” was indeed 
distinctively modern and novel. This healthy lifestyle discourse should also be considered in 
relation to the global food politics, particularly to the contemporary popularity of 
organic/ecological food consumption. There is no doubt that these current global food 
movements were primarily based on two concepts: health and environmental ethics. In this 
regard, it would be argued that Tibetan elites felt obliged to govern Tibetan food consumption in 
order to further propagate the “environment friendly Tibetan image.” 
  While vegetarianism was promoted as a healthier, more ethical and more appropriate to 
the “Tibetan character,” the Chinese eating habits were often portrayed as “unethical.” In a 
similar manner, the Chinese was accused of animal brutality and abuse. In his aforementioned 
speech shows how the Dalai Lama dramatically narrate the Chinese brutality towards animals: 
I am often told by Tibetans arriving from Tibet that the Potala Palace is now surrounded by meat shops and 
that blood stains of animals can be seen everywhere around the palace. Snakes and fish are being 
slaughtered for consumption. In the past such things were unheard of in Tibet. Hunting wildlife and fishing 
was not allowed then. Tibetans who went fishing were looked down upon, except for those near the areas 
of Yamdrok Lake. Since the Chinese invasion of Tibet, Tibetans have started eating all kinds of meat. I met 
a monk from Kham, who told me about how people sold fish in front of the Potala Palace. With tears 
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rolling down his cheek, he narrated to me the following incident: “There was a man selling fish in front of 
the Potala Palace. He kept his fish, alive and kicking, in a tin box. As one Tibetan customer arrived, the 
man pulled a fish out of the tin box and pressed its eye to the nail affixed to the wooden board, just in front 
of him. The man then cut open the body of the fish with a razor-sharp knife to remove its waste, and then 
sold it.” He further told me that Tibetans have now learnt such evil practices and requested me to advise 
Tibetans to refrain from engaging in them.”269 
Once more, pre-1950 Tibet was idealized and romanticized as a land of human-animal harmony 
and spirituality and all the negative “evil” practices which threaten this harmonious image were 
associated with the Chinese.  
Therefore, it seems clear that vegetarian Tibetan image was built on two important 
themes of Tibetan nationalist discourse: non-violence and environmentalism. It would be indeed 
difficult for Tibetan exile elites to accommodate the image of “meatarian Tibetan” while they 
simultaneously promote non-violent and green aspects of Tibetan identity. But if vegetarian 
Tibetan image is an essential component of non-violent, green Tibetan identity, why it was not 
mentioned until 2000s? As suggested above, contemporary global food politics and the rise of 
the vegan/vegetarian movement in the Western countries stimulated the Tibetan elites to 
introduce global vegetarian campaign with Buddhist ethics. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake 
to reduce Tibetan vegetarian movement to a sole marketing campaign. Instead, it should also be 
considered a form of Tibetan governmentality and biopolitics; the way in which Tibetan state 
sought to govern the “body” of its citizens. 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 
Covering a long historical period-the period from 1959 to the recent times- and a wide scope of 
events and ideas, this thesis has attempted to show how the Tibetan national identity has been 
constructed and negotiated by the Tibetan exile elites in order to obtain the internal 
loyalty/legitimization and the global support to their political cause- Tibetan political cause 
changed during the exile years; at the beginning, the Dalai Lama and the CTA was favoring for 
the total independence, then, starting from 1980s with the Dalai Lama’s declaration of the 
“Middle Way” approach, they started to demand for a “genuine autonomy”. Throughout the 
study, I traced how the themes such as non-violence, democracy, human rights, 
environmentalism, gender-equality which all have been integrated to the Tibetan nationalist 
discourse in the specific historical times turned out to globally well-known markers of 
“Tibetanness”. At the same time, I have scrutinized the political practices of the CTA in order to 
understand how the Tibetan nation as “an imagined community” has been produced and 
practiced. By doing this type of research and analysis, my main purpose in this thesis was to 
comprehend the dynamics and the factors that gave rise to the Tibetan nationalism and the 
formation of Tibetan national identity both at the level of theory/discourse and practice.  
 The main arguments of this thesis were supported by the written sources produced in the 
exile. The journal articles and the reports published in the websites of the CTA and the other 
Tibet-related organizations illuminated the specific historical time periods when the 
aforementioned themes were introduced by the exile elites, debated by the reactionaries and 
finally became part of the mainstream nationalist discourse. Based on the research on these 
materials, this thesis showed that the first decade of the exile years, mainly the period from 1959 
to 1972, witnessed the formation of the ideological bedrock of the Tibetan nationalist discourse, 
and consequently the mainstream Tibetan nationalist ideology. Two of the themes, the discourse 
on genocide and the theme of “returning to homeland”, were born out in this period and provided 
the legitimacy for the practical policies of the newly founded CTA. The very same period also 
witnessed the establishment of the main political, administrative and educational institutions 
such as the CTA, local administration units in Tibetan exile settlements dispersed all over India 
and Nepal and the Tibetan schools which all have been highly instrumental to create a “Tibetan 
nation”. The second period I scrutinized in chapter three starts from 1972 and ends with 1989, 
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the year the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, was the period when some crucial 
themes such as non-violence and environmentalism became part of the mainstream Tibetan 
nationalist discourse. Throughout the period, the Dalai Lama’s consistent promotion on non-
violent struggle brought him one of the world’s most important awards, the Nobel Peace Prize 
which is frequently considered one of the biggest cultural successes of the Tibetan campaign. 
The last research chapter focused on the period from 1989 up to the present day and discussed 
the recent trends in Tibetan nationalist discourse such as the discourse on gender equality and 
vegetarianism posing the question why such themes suddenly came into being. 
The main theoretical argument of this thesis was based on two previously introduced 
theories of Tibetan nationalism, the theories of two prominent Tibet scholars, Ashild Kolas and 
George Dreyfus which I furthered on in my own research. Accordingly, I argued that through the 
complex of interactions between Tibetan traditional culture-mainly Buddhist culture -, modern 
secular political culture-mostly Western-, and the contemporary Indian policies, Tibetan 
nationalist discourse took a very idiosyncratic form which in fact offered us an interesting case 
study which both supported the grand theories of nationalism to a certain extent and questioned 
their simplified arguments in many ways. First and foremost, this study supported to the 
constructionist approaches that see nationalism as a modern phenomenon, which developed 
parallel to the capitalist modernity challenging to the primordialist approach which claim that 
national sense of belonging is primordial and natural. In this regard, the Tibetan case study 
clearly showed that Tibetan nationalist ideology was born out in the period when Tibetans 
experienced modernity, Chinese colonialism and displacement. Particularly, the last two, 
Chinese colonialism and the subsequent exile experience became the catalyst for the 
development of modern Tibetan nationalism.  This study also agreed with the idea that 
mainstream Tibetan nationalism was primarily an elite project which was initiated by the 
political and intellectual elites of Tibetan exile community. The scope of this thesis did not allow 
for an extensive research on how and to what extent this elite project has been received by the 
“ordinary” Tibetan exiles and how did, in fact, affect their daily life. These are indeed important 
questions which should not be neglected and should be addressed in the further research on the 
subject. Finally, this study criticized the idea that non-Western or “third world” nationalism 
merely developed adopting “the modular norms of West”. Regarding Tibetan case, there is no 
doubt that Tibetans’ long and complicated relationship with the Western world in the context of 
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Shangri-la paradigm has been highly instrumental in the development of mainstream Tibetan 
nationalist discourse. As the research chapters of this thesis showed clearly, both Western 
romantic images about Tibet and Tibetan society and Western secular norms such as democracy, 
human rights and environmentalism have been adopted to the mainstream Tibetan nationalist 
discourse. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Tibetan nationalism was the product of the 
Orientalist Western imagination-as having often thought- or Western Universalism. What is 
often neglected in the Eurocentric theories is the creative use and adaptation of the Western 
norms, values and imaginations by Tibetan exiles who modified them according to the traditional 
Tibetan values and consequently turned them into something neither entirely Western nor purely 
traditional.  
  With regard to the Tibetan exile nationalism and national building process, several other 
interrelated arguments have been made in this thesis. First of all, I claimed that many important 
themes and concepts that were integrated into Tibetan nationalist discourse by the Tibetan exile 
elites were strategically created-or(re)created- and promoted by the exile elites in order to 
influence the global political actors and the supra-national organizations and thereby, to recruit 
more international support to the Tibetan political campaign. As it can be seen in the example of 
the creation of “Green” Tibetan identity, whenever some ethical issues attract global interests, 
Tibetan exile elites appropriated them creating a new- and perhaps “better”- component to the 
image of “Tibetanness”. This thesis suggested that the main reason behind this strategic 
appropriation was Tibetans’ vulnerable situation as a stateless “nation” and their lack of 
economic and political power in the global political arena. At the very beginning of the exile 
experience, Tibetan exile elites realized that national imagination would only come true through 
the global consensus of the other nations of the world. It is then exactly for this reason, that 
Tibetan elites sought a way to manipulate global actors who, they thought, could have helped 
them to regain the “homeland” or to legitimize their political claims.  
This research also showed that the construction of a Tibetan national identity was not 
only a strategy to influence the global audience but also a social engineering project of those 
Tibetan exile elites who dream(ed) to create a Tibetan nation which is capable of competing with 
its counterparts. As a part of this social engineering and nation building projects, the Dalai Lama 
and the CTA have attempted to homogenize the sectarian and religious differences of Tibetan 
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society, to standardize the Tibetan language through their educational and administrative 
institutions. As mentioned above, due to the limitations of my research, it was not possible to 
measure the success of these projects in the scope of this thesis. But nevertheless, it is still 
possible to argue that Tibetan exile elites have been successful to create an image of “national 
unity” at least in the eyes of the international public.  
This thesis was an endeavor to read and to understand the history of mainstream Tibetan 
nationalism through a global perspective without neither falling into the trap of Eurocentric 
assumptions and thinking nor erasing out West of the historical inquiry-as some of Subaltern 
scholars suggested. In this regard, this thesis is above all a humble attempt to re-think the 
essentialized categories such as West, East, modernity, nationalism and identity which preclude 
the alternative readings of history. Although I tried to do such an alternative reading in the 
limited scope of this thesis, my work is far from being complete account of Tibetan nationalism. 
There are still important questions left to be asked and answered. Moreover, I firmly believed 
that further research on the different and varied sources, particularly the extensive research on 
the publications in Tibetan language as well as oral history projects, will be helpful to 
comprehend the character of Tibetan nationalism, especially grassroots nationalism much better. 
In this regard, I sincerely hope that my modest study may inspire more researchers and research 
projects to pursue the endeavor of understanding Tibetan nationalism.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
THE AGREEMENT OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT AND THE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT OF TIBET ON MEASURES FOR THE PEACEFUL LIBERATION OF 
TIBET270 
23 MAY, 1951 
The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of 
China and, like many other nationalities, it has done its glorious duty in the course of the creation 
and development of the great motherland. But over the last hundred years and more, imperialist 
forces penetrated into China, and in consequence, also penetrated into the Tibetan region and 
carried out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary Governments, the 
KMT [p.Kuomintang] reactionary government continued to carry out a policy of oppression and 
sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disunity among the Tibetan 
people. The Local Government of Tibet did not oppose imperialist deception and provocations, 
but adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards the great motherland. Under such conditions, the 
Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and suffering. In 
1949, basic victory was achieved on a nation-wide scale in the Chinese people's war of 
liberation; the common domestic enemy of all nationalities--the KMT reactionary government--
was overthrown; and the common foreign enemy of all nationalities--the aggressive imperialist 
forces--was driven out. On this basis, the founding of the People's Republic of China and of the 
Central People's Government was announced. In accordance with the Common Programme 
passed by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central People's 
Government declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of 
China are equal, and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperialism and 
their own public enemies, so that the People's Republic of China may become one big family of 
fraternity and cooperation, composed of all its nationalities. Within this big family of 
nationalities of the People's Republic of China, national regional autonomy is to be exercised in 
areas where national minorities are concentrated, and all national minorities are to have freedom 
to develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits, 
and religious beliefs, and the Central People's Government will assist all national minorities to 
develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational construction work. Since then, all 
nationalities within the country, with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan, 
have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and the 
direct leadership of the higher levels of People's Governments, all national minorities have fully 
enjoyed the right of national equality and have exercised, or are exercising, national regional 
autonomy. In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet may be 
successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the People's Republic 
of China accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality 
and people may be freed and return to the big family of the People's Republic of China to enjoy 
                                                     
270 Tibet Justice, “The Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on 
Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,” http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/china/china3.html [accessed 
May 2012] 
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the same rights of national equality as all other nationalities in the country and develop their 
political, economic, cultural, and educational work, the Central People's Government, when it 
ordered the People's Liberation Army to march into Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet 
to send delegates to the Central Authorities to hold talks for the conclusion of an agreement on 
measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. At the latter part of April, 1951, the delegates with 
full powers from the Local Government of Tibet arrived in Peking. The Central People's 
Government appointed representatives with full powers to conduct talks on a friendly basis with 
the delegates of the Local Government of Tibet. The result of the talks is that both parties have 
agreed to establish this agreement and ensure that it be carried into effect. 
1. The Tibetan people shall be united and drive out the imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; 
that the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland--the People's Republic of 
China. 
2. The Local Government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army to enter 
Tibet and consolidate the national defences. 
3. In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of 
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Tibetan people have the right of 
exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's 
Government. 
4. The Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The Central 
Authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. 
Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual. 
5. The established status, functions, and powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni shall be maintained. 
6. By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen 
Ngoerhtehni is meant the status, functions and powers of the 13th Dalai Lama and of the 9th 
Panchen Ngoerhtehni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other. 
7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference will be protected. The Central Authorities will not 
effect any change in the income of the monasteries. 
8. The Tibetan troops will be reorganised step by step into the People's Liberation Army, and 
become a part of the national defence forces of the Central People's Government. 
9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality will be 
developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet. 
10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce will be developed step by step, 
and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual 
conditions in Tibet. 
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11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the 
Central Authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, 
and when the people raise demands for reform, they must be settled through consultation with 
the leading personnel of Tibet. 
12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-KMT officials resolutely sever relations with 
imperialism and the KMT and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold 
office irrespective of their past. 
13. The People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will abide by the above-mentioned policies and 
will also be fair in all buying and selling and will not arbitrarily take even a needle or a thread 
from the people. 
14. The Central People's Government will handle all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and 
there will be peaceful co-existence with neighboring countries and the establishment and 
development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual 
benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty. 
15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government 
will set up a military and administrative committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet, and 
apart from the personnel sent there by the Central People's Government it will absorb as many 
local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part 
in the military and administrative committee may include patriotic elements from the Local 
Government of Tibet, various district and various principal monasteries; the name list is to be 
prepared after consultation between the representatives designated by the Central People's 
Government and various quarters concerned, and is to be submitted to the Central People's 
Government for approval. 
16. Funds needed by the military and administrative committee, the military area headquarters 
and the People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will be provided by the Central People's 
Government. The Local Government of Tibet should assist the People's Liberation Army in the 
purchases and transportation of food, fodder, and other daily necessities. 
17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures and seals are affixed to it. 
Signed and sealed by delegates of the Central People's Government with full powers: 
Chief Delegate: Li Wei-han (Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs); 
Delegates: Chang Ching-wu, Chang Kuo-hua, Sun Chih-yuan 
Delegates with full powers of the Local Government of Tibet: 
Chief Delegate: Kaloon Ngabou Ngawang Jigme (Ngabo Shape) Delegates: Dzasak Khemey 
Sonam Wangdi, Khentrung Thuptan, Tenthar, Khenchung Thuptan Lekmuun Rimshi, Samposey 
Tenzin Thondup  
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APPENDIX B 
Five Point Peace Plan (1987)271 
ADDRESS TO MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS FIVE POINT PLAN 
FOR TIBET 
BY 
HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA 
WASHINGTON, D.C. SEPTEMBER 21, 1987 
The world is increasingly interdependent, so that lasting peace - national, regional, and global - 
can only be achieved if we think in terms of broader interest rather than parochial needs. At this 
time, it is crucial that all of us, the strong and the weak, contribute in our own way. I speak to 
you today as the leader of the Tibetan people and as a Buddhist monk devoted to the principles 
of a religion based on love and compassion. Above all, I am here as a human being who is 
destined to share this planet with you and all others as brothers and sisters. As the world grows 
smaller, we need each other more than in the past. This is true in all parts of the world, including 
the continent I come from. 
At present in Asia, as elsewhere, tensions are high. There are open conflicts in the Middle East, 
Southeast Asia, and in my own country, Tibet. To a large extent, these problems are symptoms 
of the underlying tensions that exist among the area's great powers. In order to resolve regional 
conflicts, an approach is required that takes into account the interests of all relevant countries and 
peoples, large and small. Unless comprehensive solutions are formulated, that take into account 
the aspirations of the people most directly concerned, piecemeal or merely expedient measures 
will only create new problems. 
The Tibetan people are eager to contribute to regional and world peace, and I believe they are in 
a unique position to do so. Traditionally, Tibetans are a peace loving and non-violent people. 
Since Buddhism was introduced to Tibet over one thousand years ago, Tibetans have practiced 
non-violence with respect to all forms of life. This attitude has also been extended to our 
country's international relations. Tibet's highly strategic position in the heart of Asia, separating 
the continent's great powers - India, China and the USSR - has throughout history endowed it 
with an essential role in the maintenance of peace and stability. This is precisely why, in the past, 
Asia's empires went to great lengths to keep one another out of Tibet. Tibet's value as an 
independent buffer state was integral to the regions's stability. 
When the newly formed People's Republic of China invaded Tibet in 1949/50, it created a new 
source of conflict. This was highlighted when, following the Tibetan national uprising against 
the Chinese and my flight to India in 1959, tensions between China and India escalated into the 
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border war in 1962. Today large numbers of troops are again massed on both sides of the 
Himalayan border and tension is once more dangerously high. 
The real issue, of course, is not the Indo-Tibetan border demarcation. It is China's illegal 
occupation of Tibet, which has given it direct access to the Indian sub-continent. The Chinese 
authorities have attempted to confuse the issue by claiming that Tibet has always been a part of 
China. This is untrue. Tibet was a fully independent state when the People's Liberation Army 
invaded the country in 1949/50. 
Since Tibetan emperors unified Tibet over a thousand years ago, our country was able to 
maintain its independence until the middle of this century. At times Tibet extended its influence 
over neighboring countries and peoples and, in other periods, came itself under the influence of 
powerful foreign rulers - the Mongol Khans, the Gorkhas of Nepal, the Manchu Emperors and 
the British in India. 
It is, of course, not uncommon for states to be subjected to foreign influence or interference,. 
Although so-called satellite relationships are perhaps the clearest examples of this, most major 
powers exert influence over less powerful allies or neighbors. As the most authoritative legal 
studies have shown, in Tibet's case, the country's occasional subjection to foreign influence never 
entailed a loss of independence. And there can be no doubt that when Peking's communist armies 
entered Tibet, Tibet was in all respects an independent state. 
China's aggression, condemned by virtually all nations of the free world, was a flagrant violation 
of international law. As China's military occupation of Tibet continues, the world should 
remember that though Tibetans have lost their freedom, under international law Tibet today is 
still an independent state under illegal occupation. 
It is not my purpose to enter a political/legal discussion here concerning Tibet's status. I just wish 
to emphasize the obvious and undisputed fact that we Tibetans are a distinct people with our own 
culture, language, religion and history. But for China's occupation, Tibet would still, today, 
fulfill its natural role as a buffer state maintaining and promoting peace in Asia. 
It is my sincere desire, as well as that of the Tibetan people, to restore to Tibet her invaluable 
role, by converting the entire country - comprising the three provinces of U-Tsang, Kham and 
Amdo - once more into a place of stability, peace and harmony. In the best of Buddhist tradition, 
Tibet would extend its services and hospitality to all who further the cause of world peace and 
the well-being of mankind and the natural environment we share. 
Despite the holocaust inflicted upon our people in the past decades of occupation, I have always 
strived to find a solution through direct and honest discussions with the Chinese. In 1982, 
following the change of leadership in China and the establishment of direct contacts with the 
government in Peking, I sent my representatives to Peking to open talks concerning the future of 
my country and people. 
We entered the dialogue with a sincere and positive attitude and with a willingness to take into 
account the legitimate needs of the People's Republic of China. I hoped that this attitude would 
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be reciprocated and that a solution could eventually be found which would satisfy and safeguard 
the aspirations and interests of both parties. Unfortunately, China has consistently responded to 
our efforts in a defensive manner, as though our detailing of Tibet's very real difficulties was 
criticism for its own sake. 
To our even greater dismay, the Chinese government misused the opportunity for a genuine 
dialogue. Instead of addressing the real issues facing the six million Tibetan people, China has 
attempted to reduce the question of Tibet to a discussion of my own personal status. 
It is against this background and in response to the tremendous support and encouragement I 
have been given by you and other persons I have met during this trip, that I wish today to clarify 
the principal issues and to propose, in a spirit of openness and conciliation, a first step towards a 
lasting solution. I hope this may contribute to a future of friendship and cooperation with all of 
our neighbors, including the Chinese people. 
This peace plan contains five basic components: 
1. Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace; 
2. Abandonment of China's population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the 
Tibetans as a people; 
3. Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms; 
4. Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use 
of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; 
5. Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between 
the Tibetan and Chinese peoples. 
Let me explain these five components. 
1 
I propose that the whole of Tibet, including the eastern provinces of Kham and Amdo, be 
transformed into a zone of "Ahimsa", a Hindi term used to mean a state of peace and non-
violence. 
The establishment of such a peace zone would be in keeping with Tibet's historical role as a 
peaceful and neutral Buddhist nation and buffer state separating the continent's great powers. It 
would also be in keeping with Nepal's proposal to proclaim Nepal a peace zone and with China's 
declared support for such a proclamation. The peace zone proposed by Nepal would have a much 
greater impact if it were to include Tibet and neighboring areas. 
The establishing of a peace zone in Tibet would require withdrawal of Chinese troops and 
military installations from the country, which would enable India also to withdraw troops and 
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military installations from the Himalayan regions bordering Tibet. This would be achieved under 
an international agreement which would satisfy China's legitimate security needs and build trust 
among the Tibetan, Indian, Chinese and other peoples of the region. This is in everyone's best 
interest, particularly that of China and India, as it would enhance their security, while reducing 
the economic burden of maintaining high troop concentrations on the disputed Himalayan 
border. 
Historically, relations between China and India were never strained. It was only when Chinese 
armies marched into Tibet, creating for the first time a common border, that tensions arose 
between these two powers, ultimately leading to the 1962 war. Since then numerous dangerous 
incidents have continued to occur. A restoration of good relations between the world's two most 
populous countries would be greatly facilitated if they were separated - as they were throughout 
history - by a large and friendly buffer region. 
To improve relations between the Tibetan people and the Chinese, the first requirement is the 
creation of trust. After the holocaust of the last decades in which over one million Tibetans - one 
sixth of the population - lost their lives and at least as many lingered in prison camps because of 
their religious beliefs and love of freedom, only a withdrawal of Chinese troops could start a 
genuine process of reconciliation. The vast occupation force in Tibet is a daily reminder to the 
Tibetans of the oppression and suffering they have all experienced. A troop withdrawal would be 
an essential signal that in the future a meaningful relationship might be established with the 
Chinese, based on friendship and trust. 
2 
The population transfer of Chinese into Tibet, which the government in Peking pursues in order 
to force a "final solution" to the Tibetan problem by reducing the Tibetan population to an 
insignificant and disenfranchised minority in Tibet itself, must be stopped. 
The massive transfer of Chinese civilians into Tibet in violation of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention (1949) threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a distinct people. In the eastern 
parts of our country, the Chinese now greatly outnumber Tibetans. In the Amdo province, for 
example, where I was born, there are, according to Chinese statistics, 2.5 million Chinese and 
only 750,000 Tibetans. Even in so-called Tibet Autonomous Region (i.e., central and western 
Tibet), Chinese government sources now confirm that Chinese outnumber Tibetans. 
The Chinese population transfer policy is not new. It has been systematically applied to other 
areas before. Earlier in this century, the Manchus were a distinct race with their own culture and 
traditions. Today only two to three million Manchurians are left in Manchuria, where 75 million 
Chinese have settled. In Eastern Turkestan, which the Chinese now call Sinkiang, the Chinese 
population has grown from 200,000 in 1949 to 7 million, more than half of the total population 
of 13 million. In the wake of the Chinese colonization of Inner Mongolia, Chinese number 8.5 
million, Mongols 2.5 million. 
Today, in the whole of Tibet 7.5 million Chinese settlers have already been sent, outnumbering 
the Tibetan population of 6 million. In central and western Tibet, now referred to by the Chinese 
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as the "Tibet Autonomous Region", Chinese sources admit the 1.9 million Tibetans already 
constitute a minority of the region's population. These numbers do not take the estimated 
300,000 - 500,000 troops in Tibet into account - 250,000 of them in the so-called Tibet 
Autonomous Region. 
For the Tibetans to survive as a people, it is imperative that the population transfer is stopped and 
Chinese settlers return to China. Otherwise, Tibetans will soon be no more than a tourist 
attraction and relic of a noble past. 
3 
Fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms must be respected in Tibet. The Tibetan 
people must once again be free to develop culturally, intellectually, economically and spiritually 
and to exercise basic democratic freedoms. 
Human rights violations in Tibet are among the most serious in the world. Discrimination is 
practiced in Tibet under a policy of "apartheid" which the Chinese call "segregation and 
assimilation". Tibetans are, at best, second class citizens in their own country. Deprived of all 
basic democratic rights and freedoms, they exist under a colonial administration in which all real 
power is wielded by Chinese officials of the Communist Party and the army. 
Although the Chinese government allows Tibetan to rebuild some Buddhist monasteries and to 
worship in them, it still forbids serious study and teaching of religion. Only a small number of 
people, approved by the Communist Party, are permitted to join the monasteries. 
While Tibetans in exile exercise their democratic rights under a constitution promulgated by me 
in 1963, thousands of our countrymen suffer in prisons and labor camps in Tibet for their 
religious or political convictions. 
4 
Serious efforts must be made to restore the natural environment in Tibet. Tibet should not be 
used for the production of nuclear weapons and the dumping of nuclear waste. 
Tibetans have a great respect for all forms of life. This inherent feeling is enhanced by the 
Buddhist faith, which prohibits the harming of all sentient beings, whether human or animal. 
Prior to the Chinese invasion, Tibet was an unspoiled wilderness sanctuary in a unique natural 
environment. Sadly, in the past decades the wildlife and the forests of Tibet have been almost 
totally destroyed by the Chinese. The effects on Tibet's delicate environment have been 
devastating. What little is left in Tibet must be protected and efforts must be made to restore the 
environment to its balanced state. 
China uses Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and may also have started dumping 
nuclear waste in Tibet. Not only does China plan to dispose of its own nuclear waste but also that 
of other countries, who have already agreed to pay Peking to dispose of their toxic materials. 
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The dangers this presents are obvious. Not only living generations, but future generations are 
threatened by China's lack of concern for Tibet's unique and delicate environment. 
5 
Negotiations on the future status of Tibet and the relationship between the Tibetan and Chinese 
peoples should be started in earnest. 
We wish to approach this subject in a reasonable and realistic way, in a spirit of frankness and 
conciliation and with a view to finding a solution that in the long term interest of all: the 
Tibetans, the Chinese, and all other peoples concerned. Tibetans and Chinese are distinct 
peoples, each with their own country, history, culture, language and way of life. Differences 
among peoples must be recognized and respected. They need not, however, form obstacles to 
genuine cooperation where this is in the mutual benefit of both peoples. It is my sincere belief 
that if the concerned parties were to meet and discuss their future with an open mind and a 
sincere desire to find a satisfactory and just solution, a breakthrough could be achieved. We must 
all exert ourselves to be reasonable and wise, and to meet in a spirit of frankness and 
understanding. 
Let me end on a personal note. I wish to thank you for the concern and support which you and so 
many of your colleagues and fellow citizens have expressed for the plight of oppressed people 
everywhere. The fact that you have publicly shown your sympathy for us Tibetans, has already 
had a positive impact on the lives of our people inside Tibet. I ask for your continued support in 
this critical time in our country's history. 
Thank you. 
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